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Regulating by Example
Susan C. Morse† & Leigh Osofsky‡
Agency regulations are full of examples. Regulated parties and their
advisors parse the examples to develop an understanding of the applicable law
and to determine how to conduct their affairs. However, the theoretical literature
contains no study of regulatory examples or of how they might be interpreted.
Courts differ about whether examples serve as an independent source of law.
There is uncertainty about the proper role of this frequently used regulatory tool.
In this Article, we argue that regulatory examples make law. Our claim is
that, as a default rule, the legal content offered by regulatory examples is coequal with, not subordinate to, the non-example portions of regulations. Treating
examples as co-equal with other portions of the regulations empowers agencies
to improve regulatory content through concrete communication, while also
acknowledging regulated parties’ natural inclination to treat such
communications as law. We reject counterarguments that regulatory examples
merit extra scrutiny, or less respect, that would relegate them to second-class
status.
We also set forth a method for interpreting regulatory examples. We argue
that they are best understood through analogical, or common law, reasoning,
and we illustrate this approach. We show how analogical reasoning can be
reconciled with the rest of the broader regulatory and statutory scheme using
various interpretive approaches, such as textualism or purposivism. Our method
places regulatory examples in dialogue with their broader regulatory and
statutory schemes. It both empowers and constrains courts, agencies, and
regulated parties in their efforts to understand the meaning of regulations.
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Introduction
A regulatory example is a portion of a regulation that applies the law to
hypothetical facts. Some examples are signaled in regulations with a heading
announcing, “Examples.”1 Others are indicated by signaling language, including
“such as,”2 “for example,”3 or “for instance.”4

1.
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 239.2 (2017) (providing examples of various types of
disclosures in warranty or guarantee advertising); 40 C.F.R. § 1037.655 (2017) (providing examples of
allowable and prohibited postuseful life vehicle modifications); 45 C.F.R. § 148.170 (2017) (providing
examples addressing standards relating to benefits for mothers and newborns).
2.
See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 520.5 (2017) (providing examples of actions for which an
environmental assessment is not required); 21 C.F.R. § 112.1 (2017) (providing examples of different
types of covered produce); 32 C.F.R. § 203.11 (2017) (providing examples of activities ineligible for
assistance under the Technical Assistance for Public Participation program).
3.
See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 963.17 (2017) (providing examples of characteristics and
criteria relevant to evaluation of the postclosure suitability of a geologic repository); 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005,
Supp. I (2017) (providing examples to clarify definitions of terms used in regulation pertaining to
electronic fund transfers); 40 C.F.R. § 1065.695 (2017) (providing examples of various types of
information that may be required from engine tests).
4.
See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 412.202 (2017) (providing an example of critical career
transitions, which require training); 29 C.F.R. § 780.310 (2017) (providing an example of a full-time

128

Regulating by Example
Consider a U.S. Department of Transportation example that addresses
when an airline may refuse to board a sick passenger.5 The governing statute
prohibits discrimination against a passenger “on the . . . grounds [that] the
individual has a physical or mental impairment.”6 The regulation that carries out
this statutory provision also acknowledges that the combination of contagious
illness and air travel presents a public health risk. The regulation provides that
an airline may not deny transportation unless the passenger’s condition poses a
“direct threat,” which the airline must determine after considering “the
significance of the consequences of a communicable disease and the degree to
which it can be readily transmitted by casual contact.”7 This language leaves
ample room for different understandings of the significance and transmissibility
criteria.
Regulatory examples relating to diseases on airplanes narrow the field of
interpretation. They state that neither a passenger with a common cold8 nor a
passenger with AIDS9 presents a direct threat. The common cold is not serious
enough, and AIDS is not sufficiently readily transmissible. In contrast, a
passenger with SARS, a serious and contagious respiratory illness, “probably”
poses a direct threat.10
What should we make of these regulatory examples? How do they relate to
the non-example text? Do they have the power to modify the non-example text
and serve as an independent source of law? Or are they subservient to it? To the
extent that regulatory examples can create new legal content, how should
meaning be drawn from them?
Despite the prevalence of examples across agency regulations, no
systematic scholarly account or judicial framework addresses the meaning or
interpretation of regulatory examples. From a practical perspective, this gap is
striking because both agencies and regulated parties pay close attention to
regulatory examples and recognize their importance to regulatory schemes. From

farmworker not within the scope of the exemption); 42 C.F.R. § 432.55 (2017) (providing an example of
costs of employing students on a temporary basis).
5.
14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2017).
6.
49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2012). A predecessor statute provided that air carriers must not
“subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 404(b) (repealed
1978). The predecessor statute was repealed in connection with airline deregulation in 1978 and replaced
with § 41705 in 1986. See James S. Strawinski, Where is the ACAA Today? Tracing the Law Developing
from the Carrier Access Act of 1986, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 385, 385-87 (2003) (describing the history of
the predecessor statute and its repeal).
7.
14 C.F.R. § 382.21(a), (b)(2) (2017).
8.
Id. § 382.21(b).
9.
Id. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and is the final
stage of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection. See What are HIV and Aids?, HIV.GOV,
http://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/about-hiv-and-aids/what-are-hiv-and-aids
[http://perma.cc
/XDP8-HUMC].
10.
14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b) (2017). SARS is an acronym for Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome, and is a viral respiratory illness. See SARS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/sars [http://perma.cc/GL6L-KNEF].
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a theoretical perspective, the gap is more understandable. Despite the fact that
agency regulations have become a principal source of law, scholars have only
begun to develop theories of regulatory interpretation. Existing theories
generally focus on background interpretive questions such as whether
regulations should be read through a purposive or textualist lens. In contrast,
there has been less attention paid to the interpretive questions presented by
common regulatory drafting practices, such as the choice to use a regulatory
example.11 In the absence of such examination, courts, agencies, and regulated
parties alike lack a coordinated understanding of the role that examples do, or
should, play in regulatory schemes.
This Article fills this gap. We argue that, like the non-example portion of
regulations, regulatory examples can serve as an independent source of law. We
then supply a method of interpretation for regulatory examples. In so doing, we
consider only regulatory examples that are provided in final regulations that have
emerged from a notice-and-comment rulemaking process.12 In other words, this
Article only considers federal regulations that have the procedural pedigree to
qualify as “force of law”13 rules entitled to Chevron deference.14
We argue for a default rule that gives equal weight to general statements of
law and specific examples contained in a federal regulation. Each must be read
so as to accommodate the other, just like other co-equal texts must be read
through a process of mutual accommodation. A regulatory example therefore
might modify the meaning of the non-example portion of the regulation such that
the non-example portion must be read in a fashion that would not be the most
natural reading, absent the regulatory example. Co-equal status empowers
agencies to communicate while acknowledging the meaning regulated parties
naturally take from regulatory examples. The co-equal approach also aligns with

11.
A contemporaneous paper addresses examples in tax regulations. See Yariv
Brauner, Why Examples? Towards More Behaviorally-Intelligent Regulation (Working Paper, July 24,
2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008261 [http://perma.cc/45D8-3QKR].
12.
Non-regulatory agency guidance also features examples. For instance, so-called
“revenue rulings” are a form of guidance in which the IRS offers a stylized set of facts and then explains
how it believes the law should apply. See Internal Revenue Serv., Understanding IRS Guidance: A Brief
Primer, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, http://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer
[https://perma.cc/X6YQ-XQWB] (explaining that a revenue ruling is “the conclusion of the IRS on how
the law is applied to a specific set of facts”). Preambles to regulations may also include examples. See
Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 1252, 1268-69 (2016) (discussing
the use of examples in preambles); see also, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Chao,
409 F.3d 377, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (analyzing examples of circumvention of union reporting regulations
given in a regulatory preamble, including “the use of joint training funds to host extravagant parties for
trustees and to pay union officials supplementary salaries”) (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 79,280, 79,283 (Dec. 27,
2002); P&V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (analyzing examples
in notice of proposed rulemaking). Examples can also be found in other related sources of law as well,
including legislative history. See, e.g., Gas Plus, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 510 F. Supp. 2d 18,
30 (D.D.C. 2007) (analyzing the Senate Report description of financing transaction that constitutes an
“encumbrance” within the meaning of the statute) (citing S. Rep. No. 106-150 (1999))).
13.
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
14.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the application of administrative procedure requirements to all parts of final
regulations.
A default rule that treats regulatory examples as an independent source of
law both empowers and constrains agencies in their effort to communicate legal
content. Treating examples as law empowers agencies to communicate law
through concrete application, rather than being forced to communicate solely in
the form of abstract statements. Treating examples as law also constrains
agencies by matching examples’ legal status with their influence on regulated
parties. Recognizing examples’ status as law thereby helps to coordinate agency
and regulated parties’ treatment of examples, and encourages agencies to
adequately consider what the examples are communicating.
In making the case that examples make law, we reject several
counterarguments that would relegate examples to second-class status.
Underlying these counterarguments is a sense that examples merit more scrutiny,
or less respect, than the rest of a regulation. This is a proposition for which we
do not find support. The counterarguments we address include those regarding
structural subservience, the heterogeneity of examples, the potential for
regulated parties or agencies to use regulatory examples to shift the balance of
regulatory power, analogues to examples in other agency guidance that do not
make law, and agency intent.
We also supply an interpretive method for regulatory examples. We argue
that analogical reasoning, of the type used in common law analysis, should be
used to understand what examples mean. Analogical reasoning identifies
relevant similarities and differences across cases and articulates general
principles that can be drawn from a body of case law. These principles can be
applied to help determine outcomes for future fact patterns. Analogical reasoning
can apply similarly to help understand the meaning of examples.
Our interpretive method must also account for the fact that regulatory
examples are situated within a broader regulatory and statutory scheme. We
show how regulatory examples can and must be reconciled with the rest of the
law. This can be accomplished using existing approaches for statutory and
regulatory interpretation, such as textualism or purposivism. In other words, our
method of interpretation is consistent with, and extends the reach of, the current
established theories of regulatory interpretation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article describes the
importance of regulatory examples to regulated parties and agencies and the lack
of any systematic theoretical or judicial framework for interpreting regulatory
examples. Part II presents our core argument that examples make law. Part III
offers analogical reasoning as a way to draw meaning from regulatory examples,
and shows how regulatory examples can be reconciled with the broader
regulatory and statutory scheme. The last Part briefly concludes.
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I. Regulatory Examples: the Gap in Theory and Law
Federal regulations are full of examples.15 Both agencies and regulated
parties look to examples as important sources of guidance. Yet the existing
literature contains neither any theory of regulatory examples nor any interpretive
tool designed to apply to regulatory examples. Courts also lack a consistent
interpretive framework and disagree about whether regulatory examples serve as
an independent source of law. This theoretical gap reflects uncertainty regarding
the proper role of this common regulatory tool.
A. Agency and Regulated Party Treatment of Examples
When agencies use examples, their effort to communicate the law is not
limited to abstract or general language. Rather, examples say how the law works
in a concrete and specific way, by applying abstract law to hypothetical facts.
When an agency uses general statements of law in conjunction with the concrete
hypotheticals found in examples, it follows a popular and proven method of
communicating legal content.16 Restatements,17 model laws,18 and the rules of
various self-regulating groups19 also use this abstract-plus-concrete format.

15.
Some agencies use examples more frequently than others. To get a sense of this, we
searched the federal register for the words “Example 2.” Our search for “Example 2” yielded 1150 rules
promulgated between January 1, 1995, and June 15, 2017. Of these, 658 were issued by the Internal
Revenue Service (and we assume cross-listed by the U.S. Treasury Department, see I.R.C. § 7805 (2012)
(authorizing the Treasury Department to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations.”)). This suggests
that about fifty-seven percent of rules that contain examples were tax regulations. Other federal agencies
and executive departments that used “Example 2” in their rules included the Department of Health and
Human Services (87), the Treasury Department (70) (excluding regulations cross-listed with IRS, i.e. tax
regulations), the Department of Labor (38), the Department of Transportation (38), the Environmental
Protection Agency (29), the Federal Communications Commission (23), the Department of Homeland
Security (23), the Employee Benefits Security Administration (22), the Department of Commerce (21),
the Department of Education (21), the Government Ethics Office (21), and the Department of the Interior
(21). Another forty-six federal agencies used “Example 2” between three and eighteen times in rules
during the search time period. Fifty-seven more federal agencies used “Example 2” once or twice. This
produces rudimentary search data. For instance, searching for “Example 2” omits some instances of
examples; although, it also avoids counting Preamble language such as “for example, (1).” The search
also double counts rules filed by more than one agency. Nevertheless, it provides an idea of the scope of
our topic. See FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bterm%5D=
%22example+2%22&conditions%5Btype%5D%5B%5D=RULE [https://perma.cc/EM2D-RC5U].
16.
Often, the non-example text may take the form of a standard, while the examples
state what the result is on certain facts. In other words, regulatory examples often contribute to a
“rulification of standards” process. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 806 (2005) (observing that incremental decisions tend to
narrow and constrain the application of standards in future cases).
17.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 16 (AM. LAW
INST. 1998) (providing general rule and nine “illustrations” on the topic of “increased harm due to product
defect”).
18.
Likewise, examples are used in the official comments regarding model laws. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 9-336, Official Comment (MCKINNEY 2001) (providing examples to illustrate the
application of the section).
19.
See, e.g., “Official Review” With Dean Blandino, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-network-total-access/0ap3000000711171/NFL-Official-Review-with-

132

Regulating by Example
A set of regulations20 addressing acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign
owners illustrates how regulatory examples matter to agencies and regulated
parties. These regulations implement a federal statute that directs the President
to review the national security impact of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms.21 A
2006 controversy over the management of U.S. seaports by a company controlled
by the government of Dubai illustrates the issue that the statute and regulations
are meant to address. Dubai Ports World agreed to assume leases and manage
major ports, including ports in Baltimore, Miami, New Jersey, and New York.22
No member of the interagency committee that considered the deal objected, and
so no in-depth review occurred. But a House committee voted to block the deal
due to national security concerns.23 Dubai Ports World agreed to back out of the
transaction, and instead sold the business to a U.S. firm.24
Legislation proposed after the Dubai Ports World controversy25 amended
the process for evaluating and blocking foreign control transactions for national
security reasons.26 It was enacted in 2007 as the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act (FINSA).27 Among other changes, FINSA made the review of all
“covered transaction[s]” mandatory and defined a “covered transaction” as one
that “could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States.”28

Dean-Blandino [http://perma.cc/3NYT-MJH9] (giving weekly review of close calls by NFL’s former
Senior Vice President of Officiating).
20.
31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (2017) (implementing FINSA).
21.
See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(b)(1)(A) (2012) (directing the President, through a committee,
to review “covered transactions”).
22.
See David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-companydrops-port-deal.html [http://perma.cc/3U2S-3YLT] (describing the Dubai Ports World transaction).
23.
See Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Panel Saw No Security Issue in Port Contract,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/politics/panel-saw-nosecurity-issue-in-port-contract-officials-say.html [http://perma.cc/Y57V-L44S] (reporting that a firm
could experience a decision to investigate as negative).
24.
See Heather Timmons, Dubai Port Company Sells Its U.S. Holdings to A.I.G., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/business/worldbusiness/12ports.html
[http://perma.cc/44ZL-GJHH] (reporting the “final chapter in a politically charged deal”).
25.
See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 145-47 (2006) (explaining that the Dubai Ports World controversy
prompted legislative action).
26.
The prior law was known as the Exon-Florio Amendment. It was enacted as part of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021(a), 102 Stat. 1107,
1425 (1988) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2012)). The Exon-Florio Amendment and related
amendments gave the President the power to review and block foreign acquisitions on the strength of a
finding of national security risk. FINSA added the obligation to review “covered transactions” and added
other procedural requirements in 2007. See Amy S. Josselyn, National Security at All Costs: Why the
CFIUS Review Process May Have Overreached Its Purpose, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1347, 1351-53
(2014) (tracing the history of review process prior to passage of FINSA).
27.
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. Law No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 246 (2007) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
28.
50 U.S.C. § 2170(a)(3) (defining covered transaction); Id. § 2170(b)(1)(A)
(mandating review).
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The meaning of the word “control” is a key definitional issue under FINSA.
The statute explicitly leaves the definition of control to regulations,29 and the
regulations in turn largely leave the definition to examples. The description of
control in the non-example regulatory text is vague. “Control” means the “power,
direct or indirect . . . to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting
an entity . . . .”30 Other non-example text also offers a nonspecific treatment of
the idea of control. A joint venture can be a “covered transaction” if “a foreign
person could control that U.S. business” through the joint venture.31
The non-example text does not give an answer to key questions about the
definition of control. But the examples do. For instance, the non-example text
does not say whether a 50/50 joint venture is under the “control” of a fifty percent
foreign partner. As the preamble explains, though, an example in proposed
regulations concluded that a foreign firm has control within the meaning of
FINSA in a 50/50 joint venture. A commenter raised an obvious question, and
“suggested that [a 50/50 joint venture] should not be a covered transaction
because the power that the foreign person has over the U.S. business is not
greater than the other party’s.”32 But, as the preamble explains, the final rule
contained the 50/50 example, unchanged. The example reveals that veto power
is enough to support “control” for purposes of FINSA.
The same regulations include other examples that clarify the definition of
control. In one example, “Corporation A” is owned fifty percent by a U.S.
investor and fifty percent by “five unrelated foreign investors” who “have an
informal arrangement to act in concert”; the example concludes that “as a result,
the foreign investors control Corporation A.”33 As with the 50/50 joint venture
example, the notice-and-comment process included discussion and negotiation
over the example’s content. The preamble explains that a commenter asked
whether such an informal arrangement would include a voting trust.34 A voting
trust would be covered in many circumstances, explains the preamble. The
decision to keep the language unchanged in the final regulation’s example
appears intended to avoid the impression that a voting trust was required to
conclude that foreign persons had informally agreed to act in concert.35

29.
Id. § 2170(a)(2) (“The term ‘control’ has the meaning given to such term in
regulations which the [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] shall prescribe.”). The
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, is an interagency committee including
representatives of nine agencies and chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. See id. § 2170(f).
30.
31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2017).
31.
Id. § 800.301(d).
32.
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,702, 70,709 (Nov. 21, 2008).
33.
31 C.F.R. § 800.204 Ex. 1 (2017). Example 2 presents the counterexample, where
the unrelated foreign investors do not act in concert and there is no foreign control. Id. § 800.204 Ex. 2.
34.
Id. at Preamble.
35.
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,702, 70,707 (Nov. 21, 2008) (emphasizing an example that finds control in the
absence of a “formal agreement”).
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The preamble also records requests for more examples that arose during
notice and comment. For instance, one additional example addresses incremental
acquisitions.36 Two others give guidance on “private equity” fact patterns.37 The
content of these and other examples is specifically highlighted in law firm client
alerts describing the changes in law brought about by the new FINSA
regulations. For instance, one law firm explained that the important factor
identified in the private equity examples is whether the general partner solely
controls major actions, such as investment decisions and board representation
selection.38
As the client alerts and the notice and comment attention to the examples
show, agencies and regulated parties pay careful attention to regulatory
examples. They negotiate over the inclusion and content of regulatory examples,
they parse their meaning, and they stake out claims regarding their effect. As a
practical matter, regulatory examples are clearly an influential aspect of a
regulatory scheme. But it is less clear what their role should be. Should an agency
make law through regulatory examples? Or is there something wrong with the
agency doing so? Should regulated parties and agencies be able to use regulatory
examples as support for a particular regulatory interpretation? Do examples
serve as an independent source of law, or should the law be limited to the nonregulatory text? If regulatory examples provide legal content, how should they
be interpreted?
B. The Gap in Theory
Notwithstanding the prevalence and influence of regulatory examples, the
legal literature contains little consideration of the meaning of regulatory
examples, or what role they should play in regulatory law. The lack of any
existing theory of interpretation for regulatory examples is understandable. The
scholarly field of regulatory interpretation has only emerged recently.39 A
number of scholars have opened the regulatory “black box”40 by offering
tentative thoughts on how agencies interpret statutes41 and examining why
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 70,706 (explaining Examples 8 and 9); id. at 70,707 (explaining Example 7).
38.
See Recent Revisions to Exon-Florio “National Security” Reviews of Foreign
Investment in the United States, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 9 (2008), http://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-andinsights/publication-listing/recent-revisions-to-exon-florio-national-security-reviews-foreigninvestment-in-the-us24 [http://perma.cc/PD4D-2L6C] (analyzing investment partnership examples).
39.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 36566 (2012) (noting that agency regulations “create” as well as “clarify” ambiguity and that courts lack a
consistent approach).
40.
See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999, 1003 (2015) (“[A]gency statutory interpretation remains, to a large extent, a black box.”).
41.
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry Into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505-16 (2005) (noting
the pressure of presidential instruction, congressional direction, and constitutional norms on agency
action); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with the Responsibility To Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 330 (1990)
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agencies make particular regulatory choices, such as voluntarily constraining
their own discretion.42 But more administrative law scholarship focuses on when
courts should defer to agency pronouncements.43 Less attention has been paid to
what agency drafting decisions should mean to courts, regulated parties, and the
agency officials who work with regulations.
As Kevin Stack has argued, the focus on standards of deference for
regulations puts the cart before the horse. Understanding what an agency
regulation means will help a court applying various administrative law
doctrines.44 For instance, under Chevron, a court should defer to a regulation if
it is a permissible interpretation of the statute.45 But knowing how to interpret
the meaning of a regulation supports a determination of whether the regulation
is a permissible interpretation.46 Also, under Auer/Seminole Rock, a court should
defer to an agency’s permissible interpretation of its own regulation.47 But some
means of interpreting the regulation helps to define its bounds and support an
analysis of whether the agency’s own interpretation of it is allowed.48
Scholars who have begun to examine regulatory interpretation in depth
have drawn upon theories long applied to statutory interpretation. The statutory
interpretation debate features many theories, including textualist,49 purposivist,
(noting influence of “statutory language,” “present political forces,” and “prior political forces” apparent
through “agency’s institutional memory”); Walker, supra note 40, at 1018-20 (summarizing results of
empirical study of agency knowledge of interpretive canons).
42.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 884-91
(2009) (suggesting that agencies may constrain their own actions procedurally or substantively for reasons
including “control of delegated authority” and “policy entrenchment”).
43.
The deference question and when courts should defer is at the heart of Chevron and
the cases that have attempted to explain when Chevron applies. The judicial and scholarly examination of
when Chevron should apply has been voluminous. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to
Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021,
1028-29 (2010) (noting and citing to just a portion of the voluminous Chevron literature).
44.
See Stack, supra note 39, at 365-75 (referring to different judicial deference
doctrines).
45.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(laying out the famous two-part Chevron test).
46.
See Stack, supra note 39, at 367-68.
47.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the salary-basis test is a
creature of the Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
48.
See Stack, supra note 39, at 371; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 588 (2000) (indicating that deference to agency interpretation is only warranted when regulatory
language is ambiguous); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). Moreover,
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), may stand for the proposition that
agencies are bound to their own regulations. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (2006) (summarizing examination of Accardi case law). But, again, it helps
to know how to interpret the regulation to decide, and to what extent, agencies should be bound. See Stack,
supra note 39, at 375-76 (explaining connection between interpretation and Accardi).
49.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534,
546-477 (1983) (arguing that a group of legislators do not form a common purpose when enacting
legislation and that a focus on legislative history materials produces an incentive to manipulate those
materials); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 9192 (2006) (explaining that textualists prioritize “semantic context” and arguing that this properly effects
legislative compromises made necessary by constitutional structure).
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and intentionalist50 interpretive schools. In the developing area of regulatory
interpretation, Jennifer Nou has advocated applying textualism, which
emphasizes understanding the meaning of the words on the page in their
semantic context.51 Kevin Stack has set forth the case for purposivism, which
seeks to effect the purpose of the law as enacted.52 And Lars Noah has applied
intentionalism, which looks to the intent of the drafters.53 But these theories of
regulatory interpretation have not yet examined questions raised by many
common regulatory drafting practices,54 including the use of regulatory
examples that are the subject of this Article.55
C. Examples in Courts
Case law also lacks a framework for determining what function regulatory
examples serve and how to draw meaning from regulatory examples. Courts do
not agree on whether regulatory examples can make law or, if examples do make
law, how to determine what that law is. Some courts downplay the importance
of regulatory examples by focusing on non-regulatory text. Other courts go
further and express that regulatory examples cannot serve as an independent, or
determinative, source of law. On the other end of the spectrum, some judges

50.
Purposivism and intentionalism are related schools. Purposivism seeks to effectuate
the objective purpose of a statute. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
1374-81 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539 (1947). Intentionalism focuses on the subjective
intent of legislators. Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1568 (2010).
51.
Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 88-89 (2015) (“Despite the
fact that regulations overwhelm statutes in number and scope, neither judges nor scholars have confronted
regulations with the level of interpretive sophistication applied to constitutions, statutes, or contracts.”).
52.
Stack, supra note 39, at 383-420; Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive
Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 878-79 (2015) (arguing that “the
agency has obligations to pursue the statute’s ends” which limit its ability to follow presidential direction).
53.
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 280-82 (2000).
54.
See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 61, 71-72 (2015), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol114/iss1
/6 [http://perma.cc/UNA5-UB29] (explaining that, while general theories for interpreting regulations
deserve more attention, scholars should also “turn to perhaps more difficult questions about which other
interpretive tools should be kept or discarded in the regulatory interpretation toolkit in light of how federal
agencies actually draft rules in the modern administrative state”).
55.
The practice of using examples also exists in statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
256(c)(3)(B) (2012) (providing examples of “extraordinary circumstances”). Statutory interpretation
theories do not, to our knowledge, consider the use of examples, at least in the United States. But see Ben
Piper, What, How, When and Why–Making Laws Easier to Understand by Using Examples and Notes, in
OBSCURITY AND CLARITY IN THE LAW: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 181, 184-86 (Anne Wagmer &
Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy eds., 2008) (explaining that provisions governing the interpretation of statutory
examples in Australia vary from state to state). The practice of drafting examples in the United States is
more common at the agency level. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated
Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987) (“Given the nature and level
of government intervention that Congress now authorizes, it could not possibly make the hundreds, or
perhaps thousands, of important policy decisions that agencies make annually.”).
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defer to regulatory examples. When courts do treat regulatory examples as a
source of law, they take various approaches to make meaning of them.
To begin, some items of regulatory guidance that courts have labeled
“examples” are different from the regulatory examples we consider here, because
they do not apply law to hypothetical facts. For instance, based on our definition,
listing a group of factors that is relevant to the application of a law is not an
example. Factors may help illustrate what the agency means by homing in on
relevant considerations, but they do not reach a conclusion as to how the agency
thinks an issue would come out. Thus, a list of types of evidence that a mining
company might bring forth to shift the burden of proof regarding damage
causation is not a regulatory example.56
When courts do encounter regulatory examples that meet our definition—
meaning examples that reach legal conclusions based on hypothetical facts—
they take various, and often conflicting, approaches to such examples. Some
courts downplay the importance of examples by focusing their analysis on the
non-example text. For instance, in 2011, the Supreme Court in Mayo Foundation
v. United States57 upheld a decision that medical residents were employees for
purposes of payroll tax liability. The relevant regulation included an on-point
regulatory example that states that a “medical resident” regularly scheduled for
more than forty hours per week at “University V” is an employee for purposes
of payroll tax liability.58 The Court acknowledged this example in its summary
of the relevant law. But the Court focused its analysis principally on the nonexample text of the regulation.59 Other cases have also displayed a tendency to
pay less attention to or avoid relevant regulatory examples in favor of the nonexample portion of the regulatory text.60
Some courts have gone further in their lack of respect for regulatory
examples as a source of law by suggesting that regulatory examples “are not to
be considered as dispositive of controversial issues . . . .”61 For instance, in
Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, a childcare center operated by the
Tennessee Baptist Convention contended that it was exempt from tax-exempt
organization reporting requirements because it was “exclusively religious.” A
regulatory example concluded that a church-affiliated orphanage was not
exclusively religious, and thus had to report, because the childcare operations

56.
See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 172 F.3d 906, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 30
C.F.R. § 817.121(c)(4)(iv) (2017) (promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior)).
57.
Mayo Found. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
58.
26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(1)-2(d)(3)(iii) (2017).
59.
Mayo, 562 U.S. at 50, 58-60.
60.
See, e.g., Biovail Corp. v. FDA, 448 F. Supp. 2d 154, 162 (D.D.C. 2006) (refusing
to extract from examples any principle related to the proper degree of detail that the FDA owed to a drug
applicant in a response); Am. Coll. of Physicians v. United States, 530 F.2d 930, 932 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing
but not discussing on-point regulatory examples and instead focusing analysis on non-example portion of
regulation).
61.
Tenn. Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. v. United States, 790 F.2d 534, 538-39 (6th
Cir. 1986).

138

Regulating by Example
would independently support a tax exemption. However, the court refused to
conclude that the regulatory example affected the meaning of the regulation. It
held that the non-example portion of the regulation left open a material question
of fact that could be decided by a jury.62
On the other end of the spectrum, some judges are willing to defer to
regulatory examples. For instance, consider the dissent in Waterman, a 1999
Fourth Circuit case.63 In Waterman, an enlisted member of the U.S. Navy
became entitled to a separation payment of about $44,000 while he was serving
in a combat zone. The question in the case was whether the amount was
excludable from Waterman’s income as combat pay.64 The majority held that the
amount was not “compensation received for active service” within the meaning
of the statute.65 The dissent argued that an example in the regulations was
“controlling.” The example provided that a reenlistment bonus earned while in a
combat zone, but paid later, was excludable. The dissenting judge thought that
the example ought to produce a result of exclusion for Waterman’s separation
payment.66 There are other instances of courts deferring to examples as well.67
Even when courts do decide to treat regulatory examples as a source of law,
they use various approaches for making meaning of such regulatory examples.
Some use a cabined approach that draws conclusions from the regulatory
examples without placing them in the context of other regulatory examples or in
the context of the regulation or statute more generally. In other cases, courts
conduct a more holistic analysis that draws support from other parts of the
regulation (including other regulatory examples) as well as the regulatory and
statutory scheme. The holistic analysis is more consistent with our argument
here.

62.
Id. (citing Nico v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 1234, 1238 (2d Cir. 1977)) (addressing
the use of itemized deductions versus standard deductions for nonresidents and concluding that “[w]e
cannot agree with the unsupported proposition that non-pertinent illustrations render the text of a
regulation internally inconsistent.”); Solomon v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 379, 386 (1976) (concluding that
corporate reorganization examples in regulations do not limit statute), aff’d sub nom. Katkin v.
Commissioner, 570 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1978).
63.
See Waterman v. Commissioner, 179 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (King, J., dissenting).
64.
See I.R.C. § 112(a) (2012).
65.
See Waterman, 179 F.3d at 127-28.
66.
Id. at 135 (King, J., dissenting) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.112-2(b)(5) Ex. 5) (“[T]he
majority cannot convincingly distinguish Example 5 of the applicable regulation.”).
67.
See, e.g., Estate of Timkin v. United States, 601 F.3d 431, 435-37 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a constructive addition to a trust resulting from the lapse of a power of appointment was
subject to the generation-skipping transfer tax). In Estate of Timkin, the court explicitly stated that it was
applying Chevron deference, noted that “the Estate conceded at oral argument that Example 1 is part of
the applicable regulation,” and analogized the grantor in the case to the grantor in Example 1. Id. at 435,
438-39. See also Educ. Assistance Found. for Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in Performing Arts
v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 3d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that organization devoted to genealogy
for one family was not a valid 501(c)(3) organization based on on-point regulatory example and citation
to case on which regulatory example was apparently based); Chevron Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.
719 (1995) (allowing taxpayer to rely on method provided in example for allocating state taxes between
foreign and domestic income).
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The cabined approach is illustrated by Lorillard, a 2014 decision in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. In Lorillard, the issue was whether
there was conflict of interest for a consultant who worked for the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) on regulating dissolvable tobacco products.68 The court
held that a financial conflict arose because the consultant advised not only the
FDA, but also companies who manufactured smoking cessation products, which
directly competed with dissolvable tobacco.69 The Lorillard Court based its
decision on an FDA regulatory example. This example found no disqualifying
interest when an FDA consultant “does not own stock in, or hold any position,
or have any business relationship with the company developing the drug.” The
Lorillard Court took this conclusion and extrapolated from it in two ways. It first
assumed that the existence of a business relationship with the company
developing a drug would disqualify a consultant. The court then decided that the
existence of a business relationship with the competitor of the company
developing the drug would also disqualify a consultant.70
In other words, the Lorillard Court relied on an example that frowned on
consulting by physicians with business interests in regulated parties to ban
consulting by a physician with a business interest in competitors of related
parties. This approach relied on a regulatory example to extract a principle that
could help decide the case. But it did not include a careful consideration of what
the example meant as part of the regulatory or statutory scheme. For instance,
other elements of the relevant law might reveal that the goal of the FDA’s
consultation process was to ensure that all viewpoints were zealously
represented, in which case the presence of an industry competitor in the review
process might be viewed as a positive addition, not a disqualifying event.
A more holistic approach to identifying legal principles in regulatory
examples is illustrated by such cases as Washington Legal Foundation.71

68.
See Lorillard, Inc. v. FDA, 56 F. Supp. 3d 37, 51 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 810 F.3d 827 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (vacating the district court judgment
for lack of standing).
69.
Id. at 54.
70.
Id.
71.
Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 496 (D.D.C.
1988). Other courts also take a holistic approach similar to the approach in Washington Legal Foundation.
See, e.g., Hilbert v. Dist. of Columbia, 23 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1994). An example in a Department of
Labor regulation provided that the salaried requirement is met when an employee is paid daily or on a
shift basis, if the employee is assured of receiving minimum weekly wages. This “minimum guarantee
plus extras” regulation is now found, with some modifications, at 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 (2016). The
regulation considered in Hilbert was 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(b) (1993). Its facts are similar to those in
McReynolds v. Pocahontas Corp., 192 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1951)). In Hilbert, the majority held that the
correct principle was that, so long as there is a guaranteed amount payable per week, the employee is
salaried, regardless of any additions, including those based on hour. Hilbert, 23 F.3d at 432 (“If it is
consistent with salaried status to calculate deductions from employees’ pay on an hourly basis, it is just
as consistent with salaried status to calculate additions to their pay on that basis.”). On the other hand, the
Hilbert dissent concluded that the principle was conjunctive and confined to the facts of the example: The
employee is salaried only if there is a guaranteed amount and also any additions to pay are based on daily,
not hourly, increments. Id. at 439 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The essential
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Washington Legal Foundation considered whether the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) applied to an American Bar Association (ABA)
committee that advised the Department of Justice regarding nominees for federal
judgeships.72 Relevant regulations promulgated under FACA gave examples of
groups not covered by the Act.73
In the course of deciding that FACA applied to the ABA committee at issue,
the court first reviewed the legislative purpose of the statute, “to open to public
scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain advice from private
individuals and groups.”74 It cited four examples of groups not covered by FACA
under the regulatory example. It then drew out principles from the examples. For
instance, the court reasoned that local groups who themselves initiated contact
with the agency and primarily operational groups were the sorts of groups who
might be exempted.75 The Washington Legal Foundation Court concluded that
none of the principles extracted from the regulations supported exempting the
ABA committee from FACA.
The analytical approach the Washington Legal Foundation Court took was
more holistic than the approach adopted by the Lorillard court for two reasons.
First, the Washington Legal Foundation Court considered the broader regulatory
and statutory scheme when it looked at legislative purpose. Second, the
Washington Legal Foundation Court considered the regulatory examples as a
body rather than focusing on only one.
Washington Legal Foundation provides a glimpse of what could be
possible if courts had a robust framework for analyzing regulatory examples.
This case engages in some reasoning by analogy from the facts and conclusions
of the examples, while also considering how the regulatory examples fit within
the broader regulatory and statutory scheme. But, while Washington Legal
Foundation provides some support for this approach to regulatory examples,
courts do not agree about how to make meaning of regulatory examples or
whether they serve as an independent source of law. This creates uncertainty and
unpredictability regarding this frequently used regulatory tool. In the next two
Parts, we make the case that regulatory examples make law, and that they should
be interpreted through a process that integrates analogical reasoning of examples
with the rest of the regulatory and statutory scheme.

distinction drawn by the DOL regulations is between payment on a salary basis (which presumably
includes payment on a weekly or yearly basis) and payment on an hourly basis.”).
72.
See Washington Legal Found., 691 F. Supp. at 496 (holding that FACA applied to
ABA advisory committees by its terms, but that the application was unconstitutional due to the President’s
control over the process for nominating federal judges) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
73.
41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004 (2000).
74.
Washington Legal Found., 691 F. Supp. at 490.
75.
See id. at 490 n.34 (citing examples of exemptions from FACA including “local
civic group[s],” “meetings initiated by groups,” and “primarily operational” rather than “advisory”
groups).
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II. Examples Make Law
A. What Regulatory Examples Offer
Good writers know that readers like examples. Style manuals emphatically
endorse examples, whether they are advising writers in general76 or regulation
writers in particular.77 An agency drafter faces the task of “compress[ing] policy
instructions” into regulatory code.78 Later, readers of the regulation must decode
it.79 Examples help with this coding and decoding process because they are
outlines of stories. They are closer to the experience of a drafter and a reader
than are abstract, logical rules. Often, the person reading the example can draw
upon his or her own experience to explain and validate the story.80 Examples can
make the law more relatable and understandable.81
Examples come from various sources. Sometimes agencies draft examples
that describe a targeted transaction or situation.82 Some examples repeat
legislative history83 or case law.84 Some translate words into math.85 Other
76.
See, e.g., WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 21(4th
ed. 2000) (“Prefer the specific to the general, the definite to the vague, the concrete to the abstract.”).
77.
See Federal Plain Language Guidelines, PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO.
NETWORK (PLAIN) 70 (2011), http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines
/FederalPLGuidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/DX7L-QK3W] (“Good examples can substitute for long
explanations.”); Rudolf Flesch, HOW TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH: A BOOK FOR LAWYERS AND
CONSUMERS 70-80 (1979) (advocating examples to explain the meaning of law in regulations and advising
regulation writers not to “try to make them up”); THOMAS A. MURAWSKI, WRITING READABLE
REGULATIONS 45 (1999) (“Use examples . . . .”).
78.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Deriving Interpretive Principles
from a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 986 (2011) (describing law
as a problem of communication).
79.
See id. (explaining that “subsequent actors” try to “discern[] the meaning of these
communications”).
80.
See WILLIAM R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE AND ACTION 64 (1987) (arguing that human beings have an “inherent
awareness of . . . what constitutes a coherent story”).
81.
See Brauner, supra note 11, at 6 (citing cognitive science literature on how examples
enable people to access the law); cf. Elizabeth G. Porter & Kathryn A. Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183, 1189-92, 1200-10 (exploring how agencies’ use of visual media affects the
communication of complex regulatory issues).
82.
For instance, the application of payroll tax liability to medical residents was an
articulated policy goal when the regulations considered in the Mayo case were promulgated. Brief for
Petitioner at 1-2, Mayo Found. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 4111636, at
*1 (Aug. 6, 2010).
83.
For instance, many of the examples in de minimis fringe benefit regulations are
taken verbatim from the legislative history. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 858-59
(Comm. Print 1985) (noting “coffee and doughnuts” as examples of de minimis fringes but noting also
that “the frequency with which any such benefits are offered may make the exclusion unavailable for that
benefit” and that, “[b]y way of illustration, the exclusion is not available if sandwiches are provided freeof-charge to employees on a regular basis”).
84.
For instance, the example considered in the Hilbert case was itself based on a
decided case. See supra note 71 (discussing regulatory example).
85.
See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.1273-1(f) Ex. 3 (2017) (defining “weighted average
maturity” as “4.994 years, equal to [(4 years * $600/$101,200) + 5 years * ($100,600/$101,200)]”).
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examples may be sua sponte hypotheticals developed by the agency to help it
think through the drafting of a regulation.86 Regulated parties may request
examples that protect a position they have negotiated with the agency.87
Examples may explain the main target of the regulations by giving the
central case that prompted the rulemaking. They may be used to signal how the
agency plans to allocate its enforcement resources.88 Or they may operate on the
boundaries, as safe harbors or “sure shipwrecks,” allowing the agency to say how
the law should apply in limited factual situations, without having to specify how
the law applies in all circumstances.89 Examples are data points that help to
define the contours of the law, but they do not occupy the field.90 The most
influential examples consider close cases.
Different examples add to the legal content of the regulation to different
degrees. Some examples may only illustrate the legal content already offered in
the non-example portion of the regulation. Take, for instance, a Health and
Human Services regulation that precludes a health insurer from restricting
hospital stay benefits for a new mother or newborn to “less than—(i) 48 hours
following a vaginal delivery . . . .”91 An example in the regulations illustrates
how this works. The example provides the following hypothetical facts: “A
pregnant woman . . . goes into labor and is admitted to the hospital at 10 p.m. on
June 11. She gives birth by vaginal delivery at 6 a.m. on June 12.” Then the
example gives a legal conclusion: “[T]he 48-hour period described in paragraph
(a)(1)(i) of this section ends at 6 a.m. on June 14.”92 This example illustrates a

86.
For instance, regulations promulgated under the Affordable Care Act include a
series of examples about the interaction of Medicaid eligibility and Medicare eligibility and eligibility for
health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act. Most of these examples were presumably written
on a blank slate, since no prior experience existed to help identify useful fact patterns. See id. § 1.36B2(c)(2) (providing six examples to help explain eligibility for “government-sponsored minimum essential
coverage”).
87.
For instance, the dozens of regulatory examples that describe how the “uniform
capitalization” rules apply in income tax deal matter-of-factly with the concerns of one industry after
another. See id. § 1.263A-1 (offering examples negotiated by airline industry, retail industry, and others).
The drafting of regulatory examples may sometimes involve only (or mostly) the most closely interested
regulated parties and the government. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with
Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 855 (2010) (outlining how an interest group might accomplish
a regulatory goal incrementally and thus fragment public opposition). See generally MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 144 (1965) (noting
the “political advantages of the small groups of large units”).
88.
See Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 338-44
(2014) (discussing project-based enforcement generally); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(c)(4) (offering
examples of transactions that are “substantially similar” to a listed tax shelter transaction).
89.
See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1385, 1391-92 (2016) (defining terms).
90.
For instance, if a safe-harbor example says that x is permitted, it does not also mean
that not x is prohibited. Similarly, if a sure-shipwreck example says that y is prohibited, it does not also
mean that not y is permitted.
91.
45 C.F.R. § 148.170(a)(1) (2017). The regulation provides further that “[i]f delivery
occurs in a hospital, the hospital length of stay for the mother or newborn child begins at the time of
delivery.” Id. § 148.170(a)(2).
92.
Id. § 148.170(a)(ii).
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time passage calculation that was already specified in the non-example portion
of the regulation, rather than adding any significant legal content.93
But other examples more clearly offer information that is not conveyed in
the non-example portion of the regulation. For instance, later in the same
regulation, the non-example portion of the regulation states, “An issuer subject
to the requirements of this section may not [p]rovide payments . . . or rebates to
a mother to encourage her to accept less than the minimum protections available
under this section.”94 Under the facts of one example, “[i]n the event that a
mother and her newborn are discharged earlier than 48 hours . . . the issuer
provides for a follow-up visit by a nurse within 48 hours after the discharges to
provide certain services that the mother and her newborn would otherwise
receive in the hospital.” The legal conclusion is that “coverage for the follow-up
visit is not prohibited” as a payment made to encourage discharge, “because the
follow-up visit does not provide any services beyond what the mother and her
newborn would receive in the hospital.”95
This hospital discharge example offers information that is not conveyed in
the non-example portion of the regulation. One can easily imagine the scene in
which a provider “encourages” a new mother to accept early discharge from the
hospital because the insurance company will cover an at-home visit from a nurse
the next day. Yet Example 2 concludes that the at-home coverage is not a
prohibited payment. Example 2 appears to limit the meanings of one or both of
“payment” and “encourage” within the regulation. In order to make sense of the
example, these words must be interpreted so as to allow the provision of services
after discharge at home rather than in the hospital, even if the at-home services
encourage early discharge as a practical matter.
When examples offer information that is not conveyed in the non-example
portion of the regulation, the question becomes: what should we make of such
information? Can examples serve as an independent source of legal content? Or,
should examples be viewed as subservient to the non-example portion of the
regulation? Should we disregard any information offered in the example that
does not merely illustrate the non-example text? Put simply, can regulatory
examples make law?
B. Examples Co-Equal with the Rest of Regulation
We argue that, as a default rule, neither the non-example portions of the
regulation nor the examples are a more important source of legal content.
Instead, they are co-equal sources of law, and each should inform the meaning
93.
Even this example could be said to contribute content, in the sense that it says that
“delivery” occurs when the mother “gives birth.” This seems the most likely meaning of the term, but it
is possible that “delivery” might be thought to mean something different, such as when a doctor enters the
room to assist in the delivery. Id. § 148.170(a).
94.
Id. § 148.170(b)(1).
95.
Id. § 148.170(b) Ex. 2.
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of the other.96 As a result, the interpretation of the non-example text and the
examples should stretch to accommodate the other, much like courts stretch the
interpretation of treaties and statutes in an effort to make them meet.97 Thus,
regulatory examples can provide new legal content that can modify the
interpretation of non-example text.
If there is a conflict between the non-example text and the examples, then
there must be a mistake in one of them. The mistake could be in the example.
For instance, the regulatory drafters may have correctly expressed the rules in
the non-example text and written an incorrect example.98 Or, the mistake could
be in the non-example text.99 The drafters may have failed to write the nonexample text so as to produce a particular result in a given transaction, which is
correctly characterized in the example.
Since the examples and non-example text should work together, only rarely
would a mistake exist that would make them incompatible. And it is not possible
to systematically predict which of the non-example text or the examples is wrong
in such a case. The default rule treats examples and non-example text as co-equal
sources of law.
The legal content offered by examples should be respected as a form of law
because examples serve as a useful communication tool. There is no reason to
force agencies to communicate all law abstractly, rather than being able to rely
on a combination of abstract law and regulatory examples. Readers’ ability to
understand examples means that examples can be more efficient than abstract

96.
See Part III (exploring how each should inform the other).
97.
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 574 (2007) (reporting
the “clear finding” that for courts, “questions of treaty enforcement all turn on the usage of rules like
Charming Betsy to interpret legislation so as not to conflict with treaty obligations”). The Charming Betsy
canon encourages harmonization of the “law of nations,” generally understood to mean treaties, with
congressional statutes. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (“An act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”).
98.
For instance, a 1954 Senate Report gives an incorrect example. It relates to Section
302 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows a corporate stock redemption to be treated as a disposition
of stock, rather than a dividend, if it is “substantially disproportionate.” This requires, among other things,
that the shareholder’s percentage ownership of voting stock post-redemption is less than 80 percent of the
percentage ownership of voting stock prior to the redemption. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(D) (2012). The
Senate report gives an example that produces a reduction in percentage ownership from about fifty-five
percent to about forty-nine percent, which does not meet the eighty percent test. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622,
at 23 (1954). It appears that the drafter of the legislative history failed to reduce the denominator, or the
total number of shares outstanding, in the calculation. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70
TAX L. REV. 377, 391 (2017) (giving an example) (citing Harry A. Bernbach, Substantially
Disproportionate Redemptions Under the 1954 Act, 33 TAXES 597, 600 (1955)).
99.
For instance, proposed Treasury regulations addressing private equity management
fee waivers contain non-example text emphasizing the “superfactor” of “significant entrepreneurial risk”
and listing relevant risk factors. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2(c), 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652, 43,658 (Jul. 23,
2015). Accompanying examples do not transparently consider the listed factors. Some commentators
contend that the examples take the proposed regulations in a direction that cannot be predicted from the
rest of the regulation. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden et al., Proposed Anti-Fee Waiver Regulations: A
Blueprint for Waiving Fees?, 57 TAX MGM’T MEMO. 87, 100-02 (2016) (providing a chart showing that
the examples do not consider the risk factors from the non-example portion of the regulations).
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rules. Treating examples as co-equal law empowers agencies to use them to
communicate effectively.
Consider the Department of Transportation regulation that addresses
whether an airline may bar a sick passenger from boarding a plane. The abstract
language in the regulation tells the airline to identify passengers who pose a
“direct threat” and to “consider the significance of the consequences of a
communicable disease and the degree to which it can be readily transmitted by
casual contact.”100 What does “readily transmissible by casual contact” mean?
Toe fungus is transmissible; venereal disease is transmissible. Yet this is not
what the regulation drafter means by “readily transmissible by casual contact.”
Perhaps the drafter could attempt to abstractly define “readily transmissible by
casual contact.” The drafter might write, for instance, that “readily transmissible
by casual contact” means that a healthy person who sits beside an ill person in a
space with recirculated air for three hours has a twenty percent chance of
catching the illness.
But what is the point of this approach? Wouldn’t the abstract rule often be
derived from the regulators’ consensus regarding particular diseases? Often,
regulatory examples can do a better job of explaining the law the agency means
to establish. Presumably for this reason, the Department of Transportation
employs examples in this regulation to elaborate the law. The regulatory
examples state:
[Example 1]: The common cold is readily transmissible in an aircraft cabin
environment but does not have severe health consequences. Someone with a cold
would not pose a direct threat.
[Example 2]: AIDS has very severe health consequences but is not readily
transmissible in an aircraft cabin environment. Someone would not pose a direct
threat because he or she is HIV-positive or has AIDS.
[Example 3]: SARS may be readily transmissible in an aircraft cabin environment
and has severe health consequences. Someone with SARS probably poses a direct
threat.101

The examples leverage both the regulators’ and readers’ ability to
understand concrete applications. Requiring solely abstract communication
would unnecessarily block the agency’s access to a trusted communication
strategy that is used by effective writers.
In addition to their usefulness, regulatory examples should be accorded
equal legal status because readers of examples naturally understand them to
mean something. As an illustration of how readers understand examples,
consider one of the most well-known regulatory examples in tax law. This
100.
101.
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regulatory example reveals how much cash can be transferred in a “tax-free”
corporate merger or reorganization.102 In the regulatory example, the target
corporation shareholders receive consideration composed of forty percent stock
in the acquirer corporation and sixty percent cash. The example concludes that
the so-called “continuity of interest” requirement is satisfied. There is nothing in
the regulations except for this example that mentions the forty percent stock
minimum, and prior to the example, the leading piece of administrative guidance
on this point was a Revenue Procedure that provided a fifty percent stock
minimum for private letter ruling purposes.103
Tax advisors nationwide rely heavily on this regulatory example to issue
strong opinions that mergers “will” be tax-free if at least forty percent of the
consideration in the deal is stock of the acquirer corporation.104 These opinions
matter. They are often issued in public deals and expose clients to securities
litigation risk if the conclusion is wrong.105 They also put lawyers’ reputations
on the line.106
It is plain in the instance of the forty percent continuity of interest
regulatory example that regulated parties and their advisors changed their
behavior in response to a regulatory example. We think this is true for regulatory

102.
26 C.F.R. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v) Ex. 1 (2017).
103.
Rev. Proc. 86-42, 1986-2 C.B. 722. The example does not clearly state that it is
giving information for purposes of the continuity of interest threshold. Instead, it is titled, “Application of
signing date rule,” and the forty percent threshold is mentioned in passing, as the example explains that
the measurement date for consideration is the date the deal is signed, rather than the date it closes, or the
date escrow is released. 26 C.F.R. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v) Ex. 1. However, the regulation’s preamble states, as
an answer to a notice-and-comment question, that “the IRS and Treasury Department believe that this
[forty percent] principle is equally applicable to cases in which the signing date rule does not apply as it
is to cases in which the signing date rule does apply.” T.D. 9225, 2005-2 C.B. 716.
104.
See, e.g., Todd B. Reinstein, Final Continuity of Interest Regulations Decrease the
Hazards of Entering Into A Tax-Free Reorganization, PEPPER HAMILTON (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/final-continuity-of-interest-regulations-decrease-the-hazardsof-entering-into-a-tax-free-reorganization-2005-12-07/ [http://perma.cc/LT37-CT8X] (“Over the years,
there has been a lengthy debate in the corporate tax community with regard to what percentage of equity
consideration an acquiring corporation needed to issue in order to satisfy the COI requirement to qualify
the transaction as a tax-free merger. The final regulations now provide an example in which the COI
requirement is met when the target shareholders received forty percent acquirer stock and 60 percent cash.
Thus, the IRS has officially acknowledged that the COI requirement will be met when at least forty percent
of the consideration is stock.”); see also IRS Proposes New Continuity of Interest Regulations that Relax
the Qualifications for Tax Free Treatment in Certain M&A Transactions, PAUL HASTINGS 1 (Sept. 2004),
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details?id=a89ede69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded
[http://perma.cc/FJ83-7P4P] (explaining that the same example offered in the proposed regulations
“provides solid authority for the proposition that only forty percent of the acquisition consideration must
consist of equity in the acquiring corporation to qualify as a tax-free merger” and that “[t]hus, a merger
where each target shareholder is paid forty percent in acquirer stock . . . should qualify as a tax-free
merger”).
105.
See Bob Woodward, Tax Opinions, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, 2010 WL
4607769, at *3-23 (Sept. 23, 2010) (exploring both when tax opinions are used and the potential
accompanying liability).
106.
Charles T. Haag & Zachary A. Keller, Honored in the Breach: Issues in the
Regulation of Tender Offers for Debt Securities, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199, 250 n.254 (2012) (noting the
“significant reputational” risk in giving overly aggressive opinions and providing example in the tax
context).
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examples in general.107 In other words, regulatory examples have the power to
change regulated parties’ behavior in the same way as non-example regulatory
text would. Recognizing examples’ status as law helps to coordinate agency and
regulated parties’ expectations regarding the role of examples, and encourages
agencies to adequately consider what the examples are communicating.
One could counter that our case for treating examples as law is circular.
Agencies use regulatory examples to communicate law under the assumption
that the examples make law. And regulated parties respond to the examples as a
source of law under the same assumption. If it were clear that examples did not
have the power to communicate law, then agencies would not use them as law,
and regulated parties would not respond to them as law.
Depriving examples of the ability to make law might be desirable, the
argument would go, because it would increase transparency and strengthen the
rule of law. Without regulatory examples, agencies would be forced to state
anything they wanted to communicate in the form of abstract rules. Regulated
parties then would not have to parse examples to determine their meaning.
Rather, they could obtain the same legal content through more transparently
offered abstract rules.
Sometimes, this might work. That is, the agency might be able to, and
perhaps would instead choose to, write an abstract rule rather than an example.
For instance, an abstract rule could express the concept that forty percent stock
is sufficient for continuity of interest. So, perhaps in some cases, abstract rules
could replace examples’ legal content if examples could not make law.
But, in other situations, the legal content of the regulations would suffer if
examples were omitted. In these cases, being forced to use an abstract rule would
reduce the quality of the communication and make the law less clear. The
examples covering diseases on airplanes illustrate this problem, as outlined
above.108 Without the ability to see the meaning of the abstract “direct threat”
rules applied in practice to a passenger with a cold, AIDS, or SARS, regulated
parties would likely look at less formal guidance (outside of regulations) or seek
inside information about the agency’s approach in particular cases. Pushing
examples out of regulations would decrease, not increase, the transparency of the
law, and in a skewed fashion that exacerbates the informational advantage of
sophisticated parties that have greater access to the agency’s informal views.109
While, of course, regulations often are not the end of agency guidance, and
regulated parties frequently look outside regulations for more information,

107.
See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text for FINSA as another example of
the influence of regulatory examples.
108.
See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing “direct threat” and passengers
with a cold, AIDS, and SARS).
109.
See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 1300, 1312-17 (2016) (exploring the dominant role of interest groups in agency processes); Joshua
D. Blank, The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 449, 485 (2017) (discussing the problem
of only certain taxpayers who sought rulings having access to secret tax law).
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limiting agencies’ ability to use regulatory examples as a communication
strategy would arbitrarily and unnecessarily reduce the capacity of regulations
to communicate the law. Agencies should be able to communicate through
concrete examples or abstract formulations in regulations themselves, with the
understanding that both will have the same capacity to make law.
C. Second-Class Status?
1. The Option of Second-Class Status
Despite the utility of regulatory examples and their influence on regulated
parties, a number of arguments can be made against treating them as co-equal
with non-example text. These arguments would support giving regulatory
examples second-class legal status.110 A second-class approach might provide
that the non-example text would govern, such that the examples would not have
the ability to change the meaning of the non-example text.
Several arguments could be offered for this view. The written structure of
non-example text and regulatory examples might suggest that examples should
be subordinate to non-example text. The heterogeneity of examples might push
against a universal co-equal status for examples. Allowing examples to make law
could problematically shift the balance of regulatory power. Administrative
examples presented other than in final regulations do not necessarily have the
“force of law,” perhaps suggesting the same should be true for regulatory
examples. Finally, agencies have not clearly shown that they intend for examples
to make law. We consider and respond to each of these arguments in turn.
2. Structural Subordination
To begin, the way that examples are structurally presented in regulations
might suggest they should be subordinate to the non-example portion of the text.
For instance, regulatory examples are often provided after a more general
statement in the regulations. The very use of the prefacing word “Example”
might be thought to suggest that the drafters consider the examples to be merely
illustrative or subordinate.
But the argument that examples are structurally subordinate to the nonexample portion of the regulation can be rebutted with an opposing canon of
construction. In particular, one canon of construction provides that the specific
controls the general.111 Examples are certainly the more specific components of
110.
There is a practical problem with the second-class approach, which is that a
second-class approach would present the problem of how to identify a regulatory example. We have
defined regulatory examples broadly—as a portion of a regulation that applies law to hypothetical facts.
This definition does not require, for instance, that examples are separately listed under a section headed,
“Examples.”
111.
See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2012-13 (2011) (explaining the canon that the specific provision controls over the
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regulation, compared to non-example text. This canon of construction would
suggest that, instead of being subordinate, examples should dominate the
interpretation of a regulation. With the “structural subordinance” and “specific
controlling the general canons” at loggerheads, neither provides a clear
interpretive guide.
3. Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity of examples may also seem to push against a general rule
that accords them equal status as law. Examples are used more heavily by some
agencies compared to others and in some time periods more than others. The
group within an agency responsible for generating the examples might often be
the group with direct enforcement responsibility—for instance, the IRS rather
than Treasury—but not always.112 Regulatory examples differ in provenance,
since they might be based on court cases, legislative history, translation into
mathematical formulas, sua sponte examples, audit anecdotes, regulated party
requests, and other sources.113 They differ as to whether they describe answers
in easy cases or hard cases.114 They differ as to whether they hew carefully to the
non-example text in the regulation, or whether they present applications that are
difficult to reconcile with the rest of the regulation.115 They differ as to whether
they are carefully considered by opposing parties during notice and comment.
This heterogeneity may suggest that examples cannot be subject to any general
rule about their legal status.
However, the heterogeneity of the back stories of regulatory examples does
not change our argument in favor of treating examples as a co-equal form of law.
Heterogeneous institutional process and heterogeneous reasons for regulations
apply both to non-example text and to regulatory examples. The heterogeneity
of regulations generally does not undermine the status of any particular
regulation as a form of law. Rather, administrative law manages regulatory
heterogeneity by subjecting regulations to a uniform set of procedural
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act and a uniform body of law
controlling judicial deference to agency regulations.
general provision). But see Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing
to allow the specific to control the general and instead “resolv[ing] the ambiguity based on the dominant
purpose of the regulation”).
112.
Teams that draft tax regulations include representatives from the Treasury and
IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.3 (Aug. 11, 2004), http://www.irs.gov/irm/ [http://perma.cc
/LY5D-SH45].
113.
See, e.g., supra notes 82-87 (giving examples of different kinds of regulations).
114.
Compare 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b)(2) Ex. 1 (2017) (giving the easy case answer that
common cold is not a “direct threat”), with id. § 382.21(b)(2) Ex. 3 (posing the hard case that SARS
“probably poses a direct threat”).
115.
A Health and Human Services example that calculates time passage after a baby’s
delivery is fully consistent with the non-example text, for instance. See supra text accompanying notes
91-93. Management fee waiver regulatory examples that do not appear to consider the factors listed in the
non-example text are difficult to reconcile with the rest of the proposed regulations. See supra note 99.
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The Administrative Procedure Act prescribes the same process—notice and
comment—for all final regulation content without regard to whether the final
regulation happens to include examples.116 Whether a regulation contains
examples or not, the procedural requirements laid down by the Administrative
Procedure Act support the validity of the regulatory content, without need to
apply different standards to particular aspects of regulatory text. The procedural
pedigree of notice and comment is an important feature of “force of law”
guidance that has been held eligible for Chevron deference.117 Existing law
offers no justification for different degrees of deference to portions of a final
regulation based on whether they contain examples or non-example text.
Making the back story for a regulatory example essential to its
interpretation could foil the effort to accept the legal content offered by the
example. One cannot always discover this back story. This is partly because not
all agency proceedings occur in open session. It is also partly because the back
story is not necessarily harmonious. Players within the institution of an agency
may have various reasons for consenting to a regulatory example, making it more
difficult to determine the actual reasons for an example.118 Lack of knowledge
of the back story does not erase the legal content offered by a regulatory
example’s text, just as lack of knowledge of the back story of a regulation does
not erase the legal content offered by the non-example portion of the regulation,
and lack of knowledge of the back story of a statute does not nullify or demote
the statute.
It is not that we view every regulatory example as an equally important
source of law regardless of its quality or relevance. This is not the point we mean
to make. Our point is that examples can make law (although of different content
and varying levels of importance based on the particular example) and, when
they do so, the law they make is co-equal with the legal content offered by the
abstract regulatory text.
For instance, some examples only give answers in easy cases, and some
give answers in hard cases. A regulatory example that gives an obvious answer
116.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (providing notice-and-comment procedures); see also
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State,
78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 533-34 (2003) (explaining how notice and comment “promote[s] the values of
fairness, predictability, and participation important to a genuinely nonarbitrary administrative state”).
117.
See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (developing the “force of
law” dividing line). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001) (exploring what type of agency interpretations are eligible for Chevron deference).
118.
One could, in theory, look to important decision points in the history of a
rulemaking project to help determine the meaning of a rule. But informational limitations would often
reduce the usefulness of this approach. It also relies on regulatory history in a way that may not be
consistent with all of the dominant schools of interpretation. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295, 1300 (1990) (noting relationship between textualism and a rejection of legislative history).
But see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1839 (2010) (discussing modified textualism’s
potential incorporation of legislative history). We mean to offer a framework for making meaning of
regulatory examples that is compatible with each of the dominant schools of interpretation.
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in an easy case119 does not offer as much valuable legal content as an example
that gives a result in a hard case, or even merely identifies the hard case.120 Also,
many examples provide safe harbors (or sure shipwrecks), meaning that they
give the answer on a certain set of facts, and leave open the answer on other
facts.121 These examples do not say how the law applies to all potential facts, and
they do not create bright line rules. An example that says that a passenger with a
cold does not present a direct threat does not mean that a passenger with anything
more serious than a cold presents a direct threat. To say that forty percent
continuity of interest is sufficient does not mean that thirty-nine percent
continuity of interest is not sufficient.
4. Regulatory Power Shift?
Treating examples as co-equal with non-example text could favor either
agencies or interest groups if one side had a comparative advantage in writing or
interpreting regulatory examples. In other words, if the process of producing and
interpreting regulatory examples were more skewed than the process of
producing and interpreting non-example regulatory text, then it might seem more
suitable for the examples not to receive the same treatment as non-example
regulatory text.122 For instance, if interest groups write most regulatory
examples, then honoring examples’ legal content might empower those groups.
If, on the other hand, regulatory examples are less likely to attract scrutiny from
regulated parties compared to other, more abstract portions of a regulation, then
our method might hand an agency relatively more power.
As to the possibility that examples allow agencies or regulated parties to
shift regulatory power, we are aware of no evidence suggesting that agencies, as
a general matter, give any more or less thought to regulatory examples than to
any other parts of a regulation, or that regulated parties or the public are any
more or less focused on them. It is likely that the focus on examples varies from
119.
See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (2017) (offering example that a trip including
five weeks of vacation and one week of work is not a business trip).
120.
For instance, the regulatory example that concludes that an airline passenger with
SARS “may” present a direct threat considers a hard case. See supra text accompanying note 101.
121.
See supra text accompanying note 89.
122.
For instance, one might propose that examples should only be issued in less formal
guidance documents not entitled to Chevron deference. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 (refusing to apply
Chevron deference to agency pronouncements lacking “force of law”). For a discussion of some of the
many forms of informal guidance that agencies use, see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?,
41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332-55 (1992); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398-400 (2007); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal
and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166-68 (2000). Under current
law, informal guidance that interprets agency regulations may receive substantial deference anyway,
under the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine. But the debate about deference for informal guidance
acknowledges that less-than-Chevron deference may be appropriate. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman,
Contemplating a Weaker Auer Standard, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 23, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/contemplating-a-weaker-auer-standard-by-kristin-e-hickman
[http://perma.cc
/L82C-36LG].
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regulation project to regulation project. Sometimes, regulated parties and their
advisors pay careful attention to regulatory examples during the notice-andcomment process. Sometimes, the development of the examples could even
precede the development of the non-example text in the regulations, as when an
agency writes a regulation to respond to an identified problem. Without reason
to think that regulatory examples are systematically easier to exploit than nonexample portions of a regulation, we cannot say that treating regulatory examples
as co-equal sources of law will shift the balance of power between agencies and
regulated parties.
5. Other Examples May Not Make Law
Agencies provide examples outside final regulations in informal
administrative guidance that offers concrete legal answers based on either past
or prospective fact patterns. One of us has examined this phenomenon in the
context of IRS publications and guidance.123 SEC no-action letters124 and the
Social Security Program Operations Manual Systems (POMS)125 are just two of
many other types of administrative guidance that provide concrete legal answers
based on past or prospective fact patterns.
Just like regulatory examples, the examples offered in informal
administrative guidance are understandable and salient for many regulated
parties. But examples offered outside of formal regulations often lack status as
an independent source of law. For instance, a court should not give judicial
deference under Chevron to examples issued in items of informal guidance, such
as field manuals, that lack the “force of law.”126 Some might wonder why
regulatory examples should be accorded status as law if these other examples
offered in informal guidance, which can fill a very similar role, are not.
Conversely, some may wonder whether our argument pushes in favor of treating
these informal examples as co-equal law as well. This would diverge from the
usual understanding that less deference applies to less formal guidance.127

123.
Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law,
66 EMORY L.J. 189, 207-28 (2017) (illustrating “categories and examples” in IRS publications).
124.
No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/fast-answers
/answersnoactionhtm.html [http://perma.cc/65HB-XQ67] (providing general information regarding noaction letters).
125.
See, e.g., DI 26525.030 MIE Examples, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0426525030#c [http://perma.cc/VG6F-DXJX] (providing
examples of certain conditions that warrant the creation of certain types of diaries).
126.
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).
127.
For a discussion of the problem of compelled compliance with respect to this less
formal guidance, see, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Anthony,
supra note 122, at 1327-32; and Randolph J. May, Ruling Without Real Rule—Or How to Influence
Private Conduct Without Really Binding, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1309-12 (2001).
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Our answer to this concern starts by acknowledging that existing law, and
most commentators, accept that final regulations generally receive greater
judicial deference than more informal administrative guidance. For instance,
under existing administrative law, Chevron deference is due to a final noticeand-comment regulation’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.128
Often, less deference is due to more informal guidance, although the line that
divides guidance that merits “force of law” Chevron deference from guidance
that merits “power to persuade” Skidmore deference is disputed.129
In this paper, we mean to focus on the largely unexamined use of examples,
rather than on what informal guidance has the force of law. It is true that, under
existing administrative law, many examples found in informal guidance—in a
press release, say—do not have “force of law” and would not be entitled to
Chevron deference.130 But the reason they do not have the force of law is not
because they are examples. Rather, it is because they are contained in a kind of
guidance that does not have the force of law.
Our analysis here sets informal guidance aside. Instead, we focus on
regulatory examples found in final, notice-and-comment regulations. This focus
allows us to clearly present our argument that examples make law that is coequal with the law made by other regulatory text.
6. Agency Intent
Finally, some might argue that, consistent with intentionalism, we must
look to agency intent to decide what to make of regulatory examples.131
Intentionalism is a prominent interpretive school of thought that looks to the
drafters’ intent to determine the meaning of a provision.132 Scholars and courts
128.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”); Kristin
E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 509 (2013) (“Where an agency employs
notice-and-comment rulemaking under clear congressional authority to adopt rules and regulations, there
is little doubt that the courts will treat the rule both as legislative and as eligible for Chevron deference.”).
129.
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (warning that the fact that
an agency previously reached an interpretation without notice-and-comment rulemaking does not
necessarily deprive the interpretation of Chevron deference); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106,
114 (2002) (“[Chevron deference] does not necessarily require an agency’s exercise of express noticeand-comment rulemaking power . . . .”).
130.
See Russell L. Weaver, The Undervalued Nonlegislative Rule, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
871, 880 (2002) (citing a press release as an example of a non-legislative rule issued in a format that does
not deserve Chevron deference).
131.
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative
History” of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2000) (arguing for an intentionalist view of agency
regulations).
132.
One problem with intentionalism is that it is difficult to prove or show the intent
of a lawmaking institution. Legal realism and public choice theory have argued that finding credible
evidence of intent is exceedingly difficult and that the draft of enacted law often reflects innumerable
motives and compromises. For the canonical critique of the intentionalist approach, see Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). The statutory interpretation method of
purposivism was developed largely in response to some of these perceived defects of intentionalism. See
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that have supported intentionalism have argued that intentionalism is essential to
protect the power of the lawmaker to say what the law is.133 If the legislature (or,
in the administrative context, the regulator) is the lawmaking body, then courts
must be bound by the intent of the legislature in interpreting the law.134 As
applied to regulatory examples, it may be problematic to accord examples coequal legal status absent some indication that the drafting agency actually
intended them to be read in such a way.
As to agency intent, it is true that we cannot claim that agencies generally
intend for regulatory examples to contribute to the legal content of a regulation.
It is likely that many agency drafters simply have not thought about it.135 Yet the
determination of legal principles from a series of concrete results does not
require that the decision maker in each particular case was aware of the legal
principles.136 In the forty percent continuity of interest example discussed above,
it appears that the example drafters were concerned with timing of measurement
of consideration value. The example may not have been conceived as an example
about the minimum percentage of stock consideration required in a merger in
order for the merger to qualify as tax-deferred.137 Yet, in the course of writing
the regulation, the agency drafters disclosed information about the stock
threshold the government thought was sufficient, and that information survived
vetting in the notice-and-comment process. Accepting the continuity of interest
sufficiency of forty percent stock consideration is necessary to reach the
conclusion of the example. Whether the regulatory drafters were focused on this
specific point or not, they communicated the forty percent threshold, and
regulated parties adapted their behavior in response to the communication.138
Our argument is that, absent a very clear statement by the regulatory drafters that
they are not communicating any additional legal content through regulatory
examples, legal content that is communicated through the regulatory examples
is law.
In contrast, the second-class approach would rest on assumptions about
how agencies act (or should act) that are not necessarily correct. The secondclass approach assumes that agencies first think of the abstract rule and then
consider how to illustrate it through examples. (Or, alternatively, the second-

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321, 332-33 (1990).
133.
See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case
for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988) (exploring the relationship between
intentionalism and legislative supremacy).
134.
Id.
135.
Cf. Walker, supra note 40, at 1020-34 (finding that agency rule drafters have
uneven knowledge of interpretive canons).
136.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 967-68 (2005)
(discussing, in the context of case law analysis, how analogical reasoning yields a result in which “the
nature of the legal provision . . . is not known before the analogical process takes place”).
137.
See supra note 103.
138.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
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class approach seeks to change agencies’ behavior so that agencies first think of
the abstract rule and then they consider how to illustrate it through examples.)
There is no reason to think that agencies generally proceed from abstract to
concrete when they make rules, or to think that agencies should do so. Sometimes
this could be the case. But it would be just as reasonable for an agency to start
with the premise that a SARS patient poses a difficult case for the regulation of
diseases on airplanes as for an agency to start with a conceptual idea about
severity and contagion. Regulations featuring examples that describe banned
transactions, such as tax shelters, show other situations where it seems likely that
the concrete came before the abstract.139 Even though the task of agency
regulation is to make general rules and not decide specific cases, in many cases
the quality of the general rule will be better if the agency states concretely how
some fact patterns come out.
D. A Default Rule of Interpretation
Rather than relying on a specific view of agency intent, or a particular
paradigm for how an agency should make law, our method can be thought of as
a canon of interpretation, or a set of default conventions that can be used to make
sense of particular drafting choices or answer certain interpretive questions.140 A

139.
See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv)(D) Exs. 1-12 (2017) (giving examples of
“U.S. borrower,” “U.S. lender,” “joint venture,” and other transactions in regulations precluding foreign
tax credit benefits in “structured passive investment arrangements”). See Susan C. Morse & Robert
Deutsch, Tax Anti-Avoidance Law in Australia and the United States, 49 TAX L. 111, 129-31 (2016)
(explaining the U.S. government’s multi-pronged effort to crack down on foreign tax credit generator
transactions).
140.
See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,
98 GEO. L.J. 341, 343-444 (2010) (“[C]anons serve as rules of thumb or presumptions that help extract
substantive meaning from, among other things, the language, context, structure, and subject matter of a
statute.”). Some examples of canons of interpretation include the expressio unius maxim (in which the
inclusion of one term implies the exclusion of others), e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,
451-52 (2002), and the rule of lenity (in which criminal statutes are construed in favor of the defendant),
see, e.g., Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006).
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large literature considers interpretive canons.141 They are useful142 but
controversial. Karl Llewellyn famously showed that, for every canon, there is an
offsetting counter-canon, and that this malleability undermines claims of
predictability and coordination.143 But despite some of the asserted problems
with canons, interpreters still require tools to understand the meaning of legal
material, and canons can supply such tools when meaning is not otherwise
clear.144
Since our method is a default rule, agencies could avoid the co-equal
approach we suggest by promulgating a different rule of interpretation for
regulatory examples.145 For instance, if an agency wants to offer examples that
141.
Some commentators emphasize a communication theory grounding for
interpretive canons. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Deriving Interpretive
Principles from a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 980 (2011) (“[W]e
assume here that statutes are constitutionally pedigreed commands and that the objective of interpreting a
statute is to recover its meaning using a theory of both communication and lawmaking.”). Others point to
the importance of considering the institutional competence of the court or other interpretive actor. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 90001 (2003) (describing the purpose-based statutory interpretation approach suggested by Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks and arguing that the success of such an approach is subject to the capacity of a court to
perform the suggested analysis); see also Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 952 (2003) (agreeing that
institutional context is important). Congress, for instance, can legislate and create a record in a fashion
that is tailored to applicable canons of interpretation. See, e.g., Thomas M. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 578-81
(2002) (making coordination argument for proposed deference canon); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The
Interpretive Voice, 38 LOYOLA L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2005) (arguing that expanded judicial review of
agency decisions “put[s] additional pressure on administrative agencies to imitate the judicial interpretive
voice”).
142.
See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 147-57 (1990) (listing advantages, disadvantages, and possible uses of interpretive
norms); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV.
26, 66-67 (1994) (“Interpretive regimes serve both rule-of-law and coordination purposes.”).
143.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). Others have
shown how canons are often used to make text seem clear, and unambiguously in accord with a court’s
interpretation, even if the analysis is not that simple. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 67, 93-94 (2005); Louis
Fisher, Statutory Construction: Keeping a Respectful Eye on Congress, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000);
Radin, supra note 131, at 873-75; see also Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn?
Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992) (“[C]anons have . . .
been abused as part of the judiciary’s systematic attempt to frustrate legislative policy preferences.”).
144.
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (arguing that “maxims of statutory interpretation . . . capture something important
about the meaning of words”).
145.
The possibility of agencies saying how their examples should be interpreted raises
a variety of questions that merit examination in future work. When and how might an agency be able to
argue that a default canon should not apply in a given situation? Can an agency promulgate a rule that
invalidates a long-applied canon? What if doing so interferes with well-settled interpretations of existing
regulations? How should the rule that purports to change the interpretation of examples itself be
interpreted? An Internal Revenue Manual reference to regulatory examples illustrates this set of questions.
The manual says that regulation drafting teams “may use examples in the regulation to illustrate specific
provisions.” It recommends parsimonious examples, featuring necessary facts upon which legal
conclusions may rest. It then states that, “An example cannot be the source of a rule.” INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL, supra note 112, § 32.1.4.4.7 (Aug. 11, 2004). Perhaps this text means only that an example
must be annexed to non-example text. Perhaps it is supposed to mean more than that. But should an
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merely illustrate the non-example portion of the regulations, without modifying
or amplifying the law, the agency should very clearly say so.146 A weaker
statement, such as that certain examples “illustrate” the non-example rules,
would not be enough to preclude reading the examples to modify or amplify the
law. Requiring a clear and unambiguous opt-out is appropriate because the optout asks the reader to interpret the example in a way that is contrary to what a
reader is naturally inclined to do.
For instance, the forty percent continuity of interest example is preceded by
the following language: “The following examples illustrate the application of”
the regulatory provision addressing the time for determining continuity of
interest.147 Should the use of the word “illustrate” or the reference to the
provision addressing the time for determining continuity of interest block
taxpayers from relying on the example as a source of law that establishes that
forty percent stock consideration is a sufficient amount for continuity of interest?
We think it should not block such reliance. This language is too weak. The
natural reaction of taxpayers is to extrapolate from the forty percent example a
forty percent safe harbor threshold.148 The forty percent threshold has to be
acceptable in order for the Treasury’s overall conclusion to be true. If the
government wishes to change that inclination, it must be clearer.
In contrast, very clear statements by the agency can change or limit the
power of examples. One such statement is in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct.149 A preface to the rules acknowledges that “lawyers may
find interpretive guidance in the principles developed in the Comments” but also
limits the scope of the comments: “The Comments . . . frequently illustrate or
explain applications of rules, in order to provide guidance for interpreting the
rules and for practicing in compliance with the spirit of the rules. The Comments
do not, however, add obligations to the rules and no disciplinary action may be
taken for failure to conform to the Comments.”150 This statement carefully
explains what the examples cannot do: They cannot give the Texas ethics board
power that is not independently supported by the rules themselves. This language
internal agency manual be capable of modifying a default method of interpretation applicable to final
notice-and-comment regulations? We think not. The Treasury Department’s own acknowledgment of the
legal content of the forty percent continuity of interest rule, see supra note 103, suggests that the manual
does not in fact block examples’ ability to make law.
146.
There is a parallel with nonprecedential judicial opinions. See, e.g., Amy E. Sloan,
If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 929-51 (2008) (explaining the need for a formalized role for
nonprecedential opinions).
147.
26 C.F.R. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v) Ex. 1 (2017).
148.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
149.
These rules are provided by the State Bar of Texas, an “administrative agency of
the state’s judicial branch.” See About Texas Bar, STATE BAR TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/AM
/Template.cfm?Section=About_Texas_Bar_Home&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=36
590 [http://perma.cc/7AWK-ZBN8].
150.
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, STATE BAR TEX., at Preamble
¶¶ 7, 10 (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID
=27271&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm [http://perma.cc/JK26-EFKQ].
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leaves open the possibility that the comments might decrease the power of the
commission, and it sidesteps the issue of whether the rules themselves are
supposed to be interpreted and understood entirely in isolation from the
comments. Nevertheless, this is an example of agency language that we think
has a specific effect on the meaning of the examples, or comments, offered in
the guidance.
III.An Interpretive Method for Regulatory Examples
Having made the case that regulatory examples make law, in this Part we
provide a method for their interpretation. Our framework contains two parts
which are meant to work in dialogue with each other, rather than in a strict order.
The first part uses analogical, common law reasoning to uncover the principles
inherent in regulatory examples. In the second part, the results of the analogical
reasoning are reconciled with the broader regulatory and statutory scheme, under
a variety of background approaches, such as textualism or purposivism.
A. Analogical, or Case Law, Reasoning
When regulatory examples implicitly add content to the law, analogical, or
case law, reasoning can uncover the principles inherent in regulatory examples.
Analogical reasoning, which applies in order to understand the open-textured
principles offered by common law cases,151 is the paradigmatic way that lawyers
reason from case to case or, put another way, from one or more sets of particular
facts and results to another. One commentator called this approach “reasoning
by example.”152 It has been described as involving the determination of similarity
in relevant respects between existing cases and the case presented, the
identification of the revealed rule or principle, and the application of the rule or
principle to the case at hand.153
To illustrate analogical reasoning, assume a case in which a defendant
failed to securely latch the cage of a dangerous tiger in the zoo and injury to an
adult resulted. The defendant in the tiger case was found negligent. Assume
further a later case in which a defendant failed to securely latch the cage of a
dangerous bear in the circus and injury to a child resulted. If relevant similarities
exist between the two cases, then one may conclude that the defendant in the
second case is also negligent. In particular, if the relevant factual similarities
151.
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1061-62 (2004) (describing how the common law is
open-textured and open-ended).
152.
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 50102 (1947). The notion of reasoning by example, or from particular to particular, goes back to Aristotle.
“Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning from
whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to the same
term and one of them is known.” ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS 69 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
153.
See Levi, supra note 152, at 501-02.
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between the two cases include the presence of a strong and dangerous animal
and an unlatched cage, one might conclude that the result should also be
negligence in the second case, because such facts are present in both cases. Facts
that appear less relevant in reaching a negligence determination include the facts
that one animal was a tiger and one a bear, that one location was a zoo and the
other a circus, and that the injury in one case was to an adult and in the other case
was to a child.
The logical underpinning for this process of analogical reasoning is subject
to some debate. Many scholars argue that it is not deductive or inductive logic.154
Some contend that it does not even require the conscious identification of a
guiding principle,155 but rather can be mediated by cognitive processes that are
not necessarily articulated.156 In the hard cases, where there are competing
principles that might seem equally supported by the principles of similarity and
relevance, some scholars have suggested that the results of analogical reasoning
should accord with moral principles157 or reasoned policymaking.158
In its most self-conscious form, analogical reasoning includes both the
articulation of possible principles from fact patterns, and also the “test[ing] [of a
principle] against other possibilities.”159 Articulating a principle and considering
what conclusions it would yield for various hypothetical fact patterns allow the
governing principle to be more carefully specified. To the extent that applying
the principle would reach inappropriate outcomes on hypothetical facts, the

154.
See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 946-49 (1996) (noting the role of
abduction in analogical reasoning); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1184-85 (1999) (explaining the various views that analogical reasoning may not be a
distinct form of logical reasoning). Deductive logic relies on an “if, then” type of reasoning, whereby if
the premise is true, then the conclusion necessarily follows. See Brewer, supra, at 947-48. Inductive logic
relies on a large number of observations to conclude that if a specific set of facts occurs, a conclusion is
likely to follow. See id. at 944-45. In contrast, case law reasoning is a less logically formal process, which
moves back and forth between the law and facts to determine what, if any, principles flow from the
combination of law and facts.
155.
See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50
EMORY L.J. 1197, 1211-29 (2001) (exploring how cognitive science patterns including mapping and
constraints explain analogical reasoning); F.M. Kamm, Theory and Analogy in Law, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
405, 413-14 (1997) (arguing that analogy allows conclusions to be reached without deep theoretical
justification); Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 2013
SUP. CT. REV. 405, 409, 421 (explaining how people mediate between particulars without having to resort
to a consciously understood rule).
156.
For a description of the cognitive science of analogical reasoning, see KEITH J.
HOLYOAK & PAUL THAGARD, MENTAL LEAPS: ANALOGY IN CREATIVE THOUGHT 19-20 (1995).
157.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254-58 (1987) (emphasizing the
importance of morality in judicial decisionmaking).
158.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
764, 770 (2006) (emphasizing that the “activity of deciding cases” involves “judicial reasoning based on
policies expressed or implied in previous cases” and is not, in many cases, “untethered”).
159.
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 757 (1993);
see also Brewer, supra note 154, at 962 (defining analogical or exemplary reasoning as “a sequence of
reasoning steps, involving a stage of abductive discovery, a stage of confirmation or disconfirmation, and
a stage of application”).
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principle can be modified, so that it reaches outcomes that better accord with the
underlying policy or meaning of law.
To illustrate, recall the caged dangerous animal examples. One could
determine that the tiger case and the bear case have relevant similarities, and that
the bear case involved negligence, without necessarily articulating the principle
that motivates the result in the tiger case. However, articulating this principle can
be helpful in applying the principle in future cases. Perhaps the governing
principle in the tiger case is that the failure to latch a dangerous animal’s cage is
negligent. Applying this principle to the bear case should result in a negligence
determination in the bear case as well.
Applying the principle to other, hypothetical cases allows for more precise
honing of the principle. Imagine, for instance, that another case arises in which
the defendant failed to latch the cage of a lion. In this case, the latch on the cage
was just for show—it was never expected to keep the lion in the cage. Instead,
there was a trench outside the lion’s cage, which experts agree should have kept
the lion from attacking humans. An outside company (not the defendant) failed
to construct the trench properly, and the lion escaped and caused injury. Given
these additional, hypothetical facts, the preferred principle might not turn on
latching the cage. Perhaps the principle is that the failure to take reasonable
measures to contain a dangerous animal is negligent.
Meaning can be made of regulatory examples through this process of
identifying and testing principles from fact patterns, which is consistent with at
least some versions of analogical reasoning.160 Like cases, regulatory examples
are open-textured, in that they “stat[e] a principle rather than a rigid or specific
rule and the principle is embedded in a set of facts.”161 Examples provide data
points, but leave other questions unanswered. In this sense, the law offered by
examples, like that offered by cases, “is always open to revision, modification,
and elaboration.”162 Principles can be gleaned from examples by considering
both how a conclusion was reached on an example’s facts and how that principle
would interact with the conclusion on future sets of facts.
Take, for instance, the hospital discharge example that concludes that
coverage for a home follow-up visit to a mother who leaves the hospital early is
not a prohibited payment “because the follow-up visit does not provide any

160.
See Brewer, supra note 154, at 962; Sunstein, supra note 159, at 757. Other
proponents of some form of reasoning based on particular results may dispute the analogical reasoning
label. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-98 (1990) (calling analogical
reasoning “an unstable class of disparate reasoning methods”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 18087 (1995) (emphasizing the deductive nature of what is referred to as analogical reasoning). We do not
mean to enter the debate regarding whether analogical reasoning is a distinct form of reasoning. Rather,
we use the analogical label to identify the case law-like method of interpretation that we propose.
161.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 151, 1061-62 (2004).
162.
Id. at 1062; see also Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account
and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2005) (“The common law is an
entity with more depth and complexity than a list of rules—it is a more intricate and open-textured web.”).
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services beyond what the mother and her newborn would receive in the
hospital.”163 The principle that emerges from this regulatory example is that athome services that do not exceed what the mother would have been entitled to
receive in the hospital are not prohibited payments. As with a case, this principle
is both embedded within the facts of the example and can be applied to and
elaborated through future fact situations. For instance, what if a health insurer
offers a new mother an at-home visit with a specially certified nurse if the new
mother discharges from the hospital before her 48 hours is up? Does the special
certification of the nurse distinguish this at-home visit from the at-home visit
approved in the hospital discharge example in the regulations? Would a similar
service be available in the hospital? Applying the principle of the example to the
case of the specially certified nurse would, one way or the other, modify the
meaning of prohibited payment. The principle of the home discharge example is
thus derived both from considering the conclusion reached on the facts of the
example and from considering its application to future facts, which also modify
the principle.
Our use of this form of analogical reasoning to understand the meaning of
regulatory examples draws on a discipline known and familiar to lawyers. It may
not be possible to set forth a formal, logical definition of similarity and relevance,
or to formally articulate how a principle is derived from the application of law
to a set of facts.164 But despite the lack of formal, logical process, analogical
reasoning requires conclusions to be justified based on reasonable, even if not
indisputable, claims of similarity, relevance, and principles.
Regulatory examples do not have the same reach as cases. An example in
a Department of Health regulation might not affect the interpretation of a
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation, for instance. But within their
sphere, regulatory examples leave much unsaid, and in this sense they are opentextured in the same way that cases are open-textured. Because analogical
reasoning respects the incremental and open-textured nature of the law offered
by cases, it has the capacity when applied to regulatory examples to evolve legal
principles over time. As more facts about the world arise or become apparent
(such as, for instance, the development of trenches designed to keep animals in),
the governing principles will evolve. This is a strength of analogical reasoning.
It allows the law to evolve as the world around it does, while still being
constrained by the reasoning of past decisions.165

163.
45 C.F.R. § 148.170(b)(ii) Ex. 2 (2017).
164.
But see Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Analogical Legal Reasoning: Method and
Evidence, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 160 (2015) (presenting one such recent attempt).
165.
But see Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 80-87 (1996)
(arguing that the accretive nature of analogical reasoning can entrench past mistakes).
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B. Distinctions Between Examples and Cases
A possible objection to our use of analogical reasoning to draw meaning
from examples is that examples are not cases. In case law, requirements such as
the “cases” or “controversies”166 prerequisite ensure that cases are based on
actual facts,167 that they emerge from an adversarial process,168 and that they
result in a judge’s decision on a remedy. Some may argue that the lack of case
law safeguards undermines the quality of the legal content of regulatory
examples, and this suggests in turn that applying analogical reasoning to
regulatory examples could result in bad law.169
Underlying this objection is the belief that case or controversy features such
as actual facts, an adversarial process and actual consequences help ensure that
the judge deciding a case makes a good decision.170 The presence of actual facts
and consequences means that the parties involved have something real at stake,
motivating them to make arguments on both sides.171 Adjudication through an
adversarial process means that the parties on both sides can make vigorous,
opposing arguments.172 The fact that the judge must specify and enforce a
remedy means that she must take responsibility for the hard, practical
consequences of her decision.173 All of these features mean that the outcome of
a case is more likely to reflect a careful consideration of how the law should
apply to the facts presented.
166.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
167.
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (explaining that the requirement of actual facts “tends to assure that
the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action”).
168.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining the importance of “that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult . . . questions”).
169.
Cf. Alexander, supra note 165, at 80-86 (identifying the risk of entrenching prior
mistakes through the common law reasoning process).
170.
Proposals to expand justiciability requirements such as standing, for example, to
provide a serviceable method for adjudicating the diffuse common interests affected by public regulation,
would modify some of these requirements, but would not abandon the idea of promoting a vigorous
adversarial process. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 255-64
(1988) (discussing standing under the Administrative Procedure Act and arguing for expanded standing
based on whether the statute intended to “confer on plaintiff the right to enforce”).
171.
See, e.g., Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 172, 177 (David Luban ed., 1983)
(“Discerning the truth is so important to the adversarial adjudicatory process that elaborate mechanisms
[such as ‘cross-examination and the distribution of burdens of proof’] have been developed to permit an
adversary to elicit information and discover sources of information from an opposing party.”).
172.
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 383 (1978) (“An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this natural
human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known.”).
173.
See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
3533.1 (3d ed. 2016) (noting the concern of justiciability doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and
mootness “that courts may be more prone to improvident decisions when nothing immediate seems to be
at stake”).
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While a regulatory example’s connection to real-world facts is less direct
than that of a litigated case, this connection is sufficiently strong to support the
assertion that regulatory examples arise out of facts from the world.174
Regulatory examples often articulate stylized summaries of a typical case that
prompted the example (and perhaps the broader regulation) rather than the exact
particulars of one person’s situation. The generality of a regulatory example’s
facts may mean that it represents the experience of more regulated persons. For
instance, when a regulatory example describes an insurer’s effort to induce a new
mother to discharge early from the hospital, it tries to convey the situation of
many insurance companies that might offer similar types of inducements.175
Similarly, while regulatory examples do not directly impose a consequence
on a specific party, they do have real-world results that give the agency
motivation to adequately consider the impact of the examples. When a regulatory
example states, for instance, that certain services offered to a new mother will
not count as prohibited inducements, there is no specific insurance company that
receives a judgment to that effect. In that sense, there is no concrete result. But
the regulation amounts to the agency’s commitment that, when the case does
come up, the articulated result will follow.176 In this sense, the regulatory
example has a consequence, in an even more widespread fashion than a case,
even though the result generally will apply prospectively and to persons not yet
identified.
Moreover, although regulations are not subject to an adversarial process,
they are subject to a public process that can help ensure that the regulatory
examples are well considered. The notice-and-comment requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act provides regulated parties and members of the
public the opportunity to comment on regulations, including regulatory
examples. Agencies must respond with reasoned explanations.177 This process
offers regulated parties and the public the opportunity to provide input that can
inform regulatory examples, much as the adversarial process can inform case
decisions.
The degree to which notice and comment results in input from the public
varies widely, in the case of regulations generally as well as regulatory examples
specifically. On one end of the spectrum, the notice of proposed rulemaking may
provide a detailed preview of the text of the proposed regulations, and the noticeand-comment process may involve the statement and defense of strong

examples).

174.

See supra Section II.A (listing and illustrating possible sources for regulatory

175.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
176.
Of course, the prediction is subject to the agency’s ability to interpret the meaning
of the regulation. But the agency places meaningful limits on the interpretive space, for itself and others,
when it writes the regulatory example.
177.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (invalidating an agency “explanation [that ran] counter to the evidence before the agency”).
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adversarial positions.178 On the other end of the spectrum, the regulatory text
generally and/or the regulatory examples within it may not be subject to serious
pre-promulgation contest.179
Yet the notice-and-comment process applicable to regulations generally,
including regulatory examples, is not necessarily more deficient than the
adversarial process. For a variety of reasons, the adversarial process does not
always ensure a full and fair airing of opposing views.180 And yet, these known
deficiencies of the adversarial process do not invalidate analogical reasoning in
the case law context.
Likewise, the placement of a regulatory example within the process
applicable to final agency regulations is a sufficient prerequisite for the
application of analogical reasoning. The process, along with other checks on
agency power,181 helps legitimize and justify regulations generally.182 If a
particular regulatory example is not actually contested in the notice-andcomment process, this does not invalidate the legitimacy of that example, or of
regulatory examples generally.183 If there is a problem of insufficient process, it
is a broader administrative law concern that applies to regulations more
generally.
As a separate matter, justiciability requirements like the case-orcontroversy prerequisite also enforce separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches. Separation of powers concerns motivate the
case or controversy requirements as a means of preventing courts from engaging

178.
See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Regulatory State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1997) (arguing that notice and comment encourages regulated parties to “posture in
anticipation of litigation”).
179.
The agency may claim that final regulations are exempt from the notice-andcomment process. See Kristin Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1728, 1749-53 (2007) (providing data regarding Treasury compliance with administrative rulemaking
procedures).
180.
See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83, 92 (D. Luban ed., 1983) (“[T]he adversary system is
justified, not because it is a good way of achieving justice, but because it is a good way of hobbling the
government and we have political reasons for wanting this.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics
of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 65-102 (1991)
(describing various reasons for breakdown of adversarial process in the prosecutorial context).
181.
For example, judicial review is one such check. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony &
David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 667, 667 (1996) (“[C]ourts’ reviewing power is the citizen’s bulwark against improper and abusive
agency actions . . . .”).
182.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541-44 (2003) (describing how noticeand-comment procedures help legitimize agency rulemaking).
183.
Indeed, one could argue that certain parts of the regulatory preamble (including,
potentially, examples) are subject to the same amount of process as the promulgated regulatory text. See
Stack, supra note 12, at 1273-77 (describing how preambles may be subject to extensive process). But we
maintain the traditional distinction between regulatory text and preamble, while acknowledging that the
preamble can inform the interpretation of the regulation. See infra Section IV.D.
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in general legislative lawmaking.184 Such requirements do not apply to agency
regulations generally, or, therefore, to regulatory examples specifically.185 Some
might argue that, by reaching concrete conclusions (although hypothetical and
prospective), regulatory examples start to look enough like adjudications, or
cases, that they should be subject to the justiciability requirements like the case
or controversy requirement. This concern evokes a deeper discomfort with
agency power, as it is currently exercised, and a sense that such power is
infringing on the power of branches of government. This concern is real,186 but,
we believe, not uniquely raised by agency use of examples.
C. Applying Analogical Reasoning to Regulatory Examples
We turn now to the question of how to find meaning in regulatory
examples. In this Section, we illustrate analogical reasoning through three groups
of regulatory examples: one dealing with a health insurer’s right to ask for
genetic information, one dealing with diseases on airplanes, and one dealing with
fringe benefits. In Section IV.D, we illustrate the second part of our interpretive
method, which reconciles the legal content of the examples with the rest of the
regulatory and statutory scheme. These two parts of this analysis do not have a
specific order. In a given case, the interpreter might toggle back and forth
between them to understand the meaning of the regulation.
1. Genetic Information and Health Insurance
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, or GINA,
balances patient privacy and nondiscrimination goals against insurers’ interests
in receiving the information necessary to process health insurance claims.187 The

184.
See, e.g., Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (explaining that standing
is a constitutional doctrine “developed . . . to ensure that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it
has been traditionally understood” and to “confin[e] the federal courts to a proper judicial role”).
185.
There is a strand of administrative law that considers the choice administrative
agencies have between adjudication and rulemaking. Under the doctrine known as Chenery II, an agency
has the discretion to choose its method. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947). Chenery II
is not implicated by regulatory examples as a general matter because these examples are not adjudicative.
Even though they use concrete explanations, they do not assign consequences to particular persons on a
retroactive basis. Cf. Russell L. Weaver & Linda D. Jellum, Chenery II and the Development of Federal
Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (2007) (explaining that Chenery II relates to the
question of whether “legislative procedure” is required for “broad, prospective rules”).
186.
The literature regarding the legitimacy of agencies is vast. For a seminal, skeptical
view of agency legitimacy, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1231, 1233-49 (1994).
187.
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000ff (2012). There are a number of different regulations in different portions of the code of federal
regulations implementing the act. See 74 Fed. Reg. 51664-01 (Oct. 7, 2009) (preamble describing
implementation by the Department of Treasury, Department of Labor, and Department of Health and
Human Services). The regulations referred to in this discussion are those that were implemented by the
Department of Health and Human Services, which apply to health insurers in the individual market. See
id.

166

Regulating by Example
non-example portion of certain regulations under GINA prohibits insurers from
using genetic information for underwriting purposes, but permits insurers to
condition coverage for specific medical benefits on such information, although
the insurance company may only require “the minimum amount of genetic
information necessary” to process the claim.188 The more that insurers may use
genetic information to screen claims, the less protection is offered by the
prohibition on using genetic information for underwriting purposes. In other
words, the non-example portion of the regulations features a general rule and an
exception that threatens to swallow it. Examples in the GINA regulations begin
to show the bounds of the exception.
Examples 2 and 3 deal with breast cancer screening and treatment indicated
(or not) by genetic mutations. Both examples allow insurers to require evidence
of a patient’s own genetic information. Together, Examples 2 and 3 reveal that
an insurer sometimes may ask for genetic information to determine whether to
allow or deny treatment. In Example 2, the presence of a gene mutation supports
early mammograms. This is offered as an example of a situation where “genetic
information is necessary” to determine medical appropriateness.189 As a result,
188.

45 C.F.R. § 148.180(f)(1)(iii) (2017). The full text of this section reads:

(iii) Medical appropriateness. An issuer in the individual market may limit or exclude a
benefit based on whether the benefit is medically appropriate, and the determination of
whether the benefit is medically appropriate is not within the meaning of underwriting
purposes. Accordingly, if an issuer conditions a benefit based on its medical appropriateness
and the medical appropriateness of the benefit depends on a covered individual’s genetic
information, the issuer is permitted to condition the benefit on the genetic information.
An issuer is permitted to request only the minimum amount of genetic information necessary
to determine medical appropriateness, and may deny the benefit if the covered individual
does not provide the genetic information required to determine medical
appropriateness. See paragraph (g) of this section for examples illustrating the applicability
of this paragraph (f)(1)(iii), as well as other provisions of this section.
Id.

189.

Example 2 reads as follows:

(i) Facts. Individual J has an individual health insurance policy through Issuer V that covers
a yearly mammogram for participants starting at age 40, or at age 30 for those with increased
risk for breast cancer, including individuals with BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutations. J is 33
years old and has the BRCA2 mutation. J undergoes a mammogram and promptly submits
a claim to V for reimbursement. V asks J for evidence of increased risk of breast cancer, such
as the results of a genetic test, before the claim for the mammogram is paid.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 2, V does not violate paragraphs (e) or (f) of this section.
Under paragraph (e), an issuer is permitted to request and use the results of a genetic test to
make a determination regarding payment, provided the issuer requests only the minimum
amount of information necessary. Because the medical appropriateness of the mammogram
depends on the covered individual’s genetic makeup, the minimum amount of information
necessary includes the results of the genetic test. Similarly, V does not violate paragraph
(f) of this section because an issuer is permitted to request genetic information in making a
determination regarding the medical appropriateness of a claim if the genetic information is
necessary to make the determination (and the genetic information is not used for
underwriting purposes).
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in Example 2, the insurer may request that the patient provide genetic test results
before paying for the early mammogram.190
Example 3 is the converse of Example 2. In Example 3, “the latest scientific
research” shows that if a breast cancer patient has a certain gene, a certain
medicine is not helpful, and up to seven percent of breast cancer patients have
the gene.191 The example says that the insurer can request evidence of the
absence of that gene and deny payment if the gene is present.192
In contrast to Examples 2 and 3, Example 1 prohibits an insurance company
from asking for a patient’s genetic test results. Example 1 describes an insured
individual “with dependent coverage” who has a policy that covers genetic
testing for celiac disease “for individuals who have family members with this
condition.”193 The insured undergoes a celiac disease test “after his son is
diagnosed with celiac disease.” The example concludes that the insurer may not
request the test results for the insured father as a prerequisite to paying for that

Id. § 1.148.180(g) Ex. 2 (2017)
190.
Id. § 148.180(g) Ex. 2.
191.
Example 3 reads as follows:
(i) Facts. Individual K was previously diagnosed with and treated for breast cancer, which
is currently in remission. In accordance with the recommendation of K’s physician, K has
been taking a regular dose of tamoxifen to help prevent a recurrence. K has an individual
health insurance policy through Issuer W which adopts a new policy requiring patients taking
tamoxifen to undergo a genetic test to ensure that tamoxifen is medically appropriate for
their genetic makeup. In accordance with, at the time, the latest scientific research, tamoxifen
is not helpful in up to 7 percent of breast cancer patients with certain variations of the gene
for making the CYP2D6 enzyme. If a patient has a gene variant making tamoxifen not
medically appropriate, W does not pay for the tamoxifen prescription.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 3, W does not violate paragraph (e) of this section if it
conditions future payments for the tamoxifen prescription on K’s undergoing a genetic test
to determine the genetic markers K has for making the CYP2D6 enzyme. W also does not
violate paragraph (e) of this section if it refuses future payment if the results of the genetic
test indicate that tamoxifen is not medically appropriate for K.
Id. § 1.148.180(g) Ex. 3.
192.
Id. § 148.180(g) Ex. 3.
193.
Example 1 reads as follows:
(i) Facts. Individual I has an individual health insurance policy through Issuer U that covers
genetic testing for celiac disease for individuals who have family members with this
condition. I’s policy includes dependent coverage. After I’s son is diagnosed with celiac
disease, I undergoes a genetic test and promptly submits a claim for the test to U for
reimbursement. U asks I to provide the results of the genetic test before the claim is paid.
(ii) Conclusion. In this Example 1, under the rules of paragraph (e)(4) of this section, U is
permitted to request only the minimum amount of information necessary to make a decision
regarding payment. Because the results of the test are not necessary for U to make a decision
regarding the payment of I’s claim, U’s request for the results of the genetic test
violates paragraph (e) of this section.
Id. § 1.148.180(g) Ex. 1 (2017)
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test.194 Example 1 departs from Examples 2 and 3 when Example 1 provides that
the insurance company may not request the results of the insured’s own genetic
information, i.e., the results of the celiac disease test. From an analogical
reasoning perspective, this raises the question: what does the distinction between
Example 1, on the one hand, and Examples 2 and 3, on the other hand,
communicate about the limits on insurers asking for genetic information?
At least one advocacy group has suggested that Example 1 means that, in
general, an insurance company may not ask for an insured individual’s own test
results to show family history. The Huntington Disease Society of America
(HDSA) website features “Sam”, who gets a test for Huntington’s disease after
Sam’s father is diagnosed with that condition. Sam’s insurance covers such
testing if there is a family history. The insurance company requests the test
results for Sam, the insured son, before paying the claim for Sam’s test. The
HDSA concludes that if an insurance company requests Sam’s test results, that
“may have violated GINA because . . . it is not necessary for his insurance to
learn the results of Sam’s own test.”195
However, analogical reasoning suggests that this is not the only possible
reading of Example 1. In Example 1, there is good reason to believe that the
family history evidence was already in the insurance company’s hands. This is
because the insured individual had dependent care coverage and the insured
individual’s son had the disease.196 In the HDSA scenario, there is less reason to
believe that the insurance company already had evidence of the requisite family
history, because the insured individual is the son, not the father, of the individual
known to have the disease. There is no suggestion in the HDSA description that
the policy that covers Sam, the insured, also covers his father, who is the
individual diagnosed with Huntington’s disease. If Sam’s father’s test results are
not available, then perhaps the insurance company could ask for other
information including, potentially, Sam’s own test results197—which, if positive,
also provide evidence of family history.
2. Diseases on Planes
As another illustration of how regulatory examples add content to law,
consider the problem of whether a sick passenger may board an airplane.198 On
the one hand, passengers have an interest in equal access to common carriers,
which is based in anti-discrimination law. On the other hand, there is a public

194.
Id.
195.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, HUNTINGTON’S DISEASE SOC’Y
OF AM., http://hdsa.org/living-with-hd/gina/ [http://perma.cc/H242-RH2P].
196.
45 C.F.R § 148.180(g) Ex. 1.
197.
In other words, the insurance company might request Sam’s test results if it did
not have access to other evidence of family history.
198.
14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2017).
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health interest in avoiding transmission of disease. How should the two interests
be balanced?
As previously mentioned, a Department of Transportation regulation
addresses this tension. It states that an airline may not restrict passenger
transportation based on the passenger having a communicable disease or other
medical condition unless the passenger’s condition poses a “direct threat.”199 It
says that in evaluating the threat of a disease, the airline must “consider the
significance of the consequences of a communicable disease and the degree to
which it can readily be transmitted by casual contact.”200
This standard presents a series of interpretive questions. Should an airline
measure the danger presented by a disease by reference to a typical healthy
passenger, or should it consider whether fellow passengers include any
individual with a compromised immune system? Should “casual contact”
account for the inevitable proximity and recirculated air of the air cabin
environment? Should it assume well-behaved passengers? May an airline deny
transportation if a passenger’s illness is communicable, but not serious? If the
illness is serious, but not communicable?
The regulatory examples help. The first says that the common cold does not
present a direct threat—although a cold is “readily transmissible in an aircraft
cabin environment,” it “does not have severe health consequences.”201 The
second says that AIDS does not present a direct threat—although AIDS has
“severe health consequences,” it is not “readily transmissible in an aircraft cabin
environment.”202 The third says that SARS “probably poses a direct threat”—it
“may be readily transmissible” and “has severe health consequences.”203
When the regulation writers say in the examples how the law applies to
particular facts, they do not explain how the law would apply to all cases. As the
SARS example confirms, the drafters are even hesitant to express a definitive
outcome when diseases are severe and may be readily transmissible. In this
sense, the examples only offer limited data points. As we explained previously,
they do not fully occupy the field.
But these limited data points nonetheless provide a framework that extends
beyond the examples themselves. For instance, the examples assume passengers
with no special vulnerability to illness. As far as this set of examples is
concerned, eggshell passengers have no special rights. By concluding that a
common cold is not a direct threat, the regulations communicate that an airline
cannot exclude one sick passenger on the grounds that another passenger has a
compromised immune system that makes a common cold very dangerous.
Instead, the regulations require that every airline passenger accept some level of

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Id. § 382.21(a).
Id. § 382.21(b)(2).
Id. § 382.21(b)(2) Ex. 1.
Id. § 382.21(b)(2) Ex. 2.
Id. § 382.21(b)(2) Ex. 3.
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exposure to disease, just as individuals accept some level of exposure elsewhere
in public spaces in their daily lives, at work, school, errands and so forth.
The examples also assume a limited range of activities for passengers on
airplanes. The conclusion that AIDS is not “readily transmissible” is possible
because of the underlying view that passengers are not sharing needles, for
instance, or that, if they are, it is not the business of the airline to protect them.
If passenger behavior produces a risk of AIDS transmission on an airplane,
passengers bear that risk themselves, as far as these regulations are concerned.
The examples also convey that the “direct threat” threshold sets a fairly
high bar. The airline must consider conjunctively (not disjunctively) two factors:
the seriousness and the transmissibility of the disease. A disease that is only
serious, like AIDS, does not pose a direct threat. A disease that is only readily
transmissible, like a cold, also does not pose a direct threat. Where a disease is
clearly serious and “may be” readily transmissible, as in the SARS example, the
regulation only concludes that a direct threat “probably” exists. The SARS
outbreak of 2003 involved a deadly disease that was widely reported to have
spread via air travel.204 Yet in the regulations, promulgated in 2008, SARS is
offered as a close case where the public access interest and the public health
interest could just about balance.205
3. Fringe Benefits
When an employer provides an employee with perks, such as use of a
company car or free coffee at work, having the perks treated as “de minimis
fringe benefits” for tax purposes is favorable for the employee. De minimis
fringe benefits are excluded from compensation income for tax purposes. The
regulation that defines these benefits provides that “de minimis fringe” means
“any property or service the value of which is (after taking into account the
204.
See, e.g., Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious
Diseases During Commercial Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 991-92 (2005) (noting air travel’s “important
role” in the spread of SARS).
205.
One possibility is that Example 3 implies that the existence of both conditions
would establish a direct threat. A close, textual reading of the examples suggests this possibility. The
common cold example and the AIDS example refer to a disease that “is readily transmissible” or “is not
readily transmissible,” respectively. 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b) (emphasis added). But Example 3 reads as
follows: “SARS may be readily transmissible in an aircraft cabin environment and has severe health
consequences. Someone with SARS probably poses a direct threat.” Id. (emphasis added). “May be,” as
used in Example 3, could have one of two different definitions. First, “may be” could indicate “has the
ability to be” which would mean that, in Example 3, the disease has the ability to be readily transmissible,
or in other words, “is” readily transmissible. The use of the language “may be” to mean “is” would sit
uncomfortably with the rest of the regulatory examples, since the other examples demonstrate that the
regulation writers can certainly use “is” to indicate definite, ready transmissibility (for the common cold)
and definite seriousness (for AIDS and SARS). Alternatively, “may be” can indicate possibility or
probability (as in “you may be right”). May, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/may [http://perma.cc/Q9ZL-R9H2]. In this reading, “may be readily transmissible” means “is
possibly readily transmissible” (without clarity regarding whether it is). Under the latter reading, the
disease is severe but is only possibly (rather than definitively) readily transmissible, potentially implying
that severity and definite ease of transmissibility would be a direct threat.
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frequency with which similar fringes are provided . . . ) so small as to make
accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”206
This language leaves questions unanswered. What qualifies as infrequent?
Small? Unreasonable or impracticable to account for? Should the rule be read as
a conjunctive test, such that a benefit qualifies as a de minimis fringe only if it is
(1) infrequent, (2) small, and (3) unreasonable or impracticable to account for?
Or will some subset of these characteristics suffice? Alternatively, do “small”
and/or “infrequent” define what is “unreasonable” or “impracticable” to account
for? If so, how do they do so?
The regulations help answer these questions by providing examples. First,
the regulations offer examples of the amenities available in a comfortable
American office, circa 1984.207 Employees may make “occasional” personal
photocopies and “local telephone calls.”208 They are provided with work snacks
of “coffee, doughnuts and soft drinks” and treated to (or subjected to)
“occasional cocktail parties, group meals, or picnics.”209 The regulations
conclude that these are all examples of de minimis fringes.210
On the other hand, the regulations also offer examples of perks that are not
de minimis fringes.211 These examples paint the picture of employee perks that
go above and beyond the regular office amenities. They include “season tickets,”
“private country club” membership, and a weekend at a “hunting lodge”
provided to an employee.212
Many readers will easily connect the examples to their own experience.213
Some may think of coffee fetched from the office kitchenette and wonder why it
was even necessary to write the coffee example. Did lawmakers seriously
consider the possibility that work coffee might be taxable compensation? Did
they really need to offer the example to preclude this outcome? Others may read
the example of coffee, doughnuts and soft drinks and wonder how far it extends.
What if an employee enjoys free coffee and doughnuts every single workday?
Are the snacks still excluded from income?214 Whether or not the reader finds
the outcomes of the examples intuitive, they are helpful. They are understandable
and relatable. People can anchor their understanding of the examples in their own
experience. By telling a story of what de minimis fringes look like through
206.
26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(a) (2017). This language follows the statute. See I.R.C. §
132(e)(1) (2017).
207.
They are based on Section 132(d)’s legislative history, which accompanied a
statute enacted in 1984. See supra note 83 (describing the Congressional report).
208.
26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(e)(1).
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id. § 1.132-6(e)(2).
212.
Id.
213.
See Brauner, supra note 11 (explaining the cognitive process through which a
reader understands an example by connecting its facts to the reader’s own experience).
214.
See RICHARD SCHMALBECK ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 212 (4th ed.
2015) (describing “Larry,” who consumes “gourmet coffee” and “croissants” with “particular
enthusiasm”).
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examples, the regulation offers readers an easy way to access the abstract nonexample rules.
The fringe benefit examples also modify the understanding of the nonexample portion of the regulations. For instance, the non-example language in
the regulations215 could be read to suggest that only benefits that are small and
infrequent will be “unreasonable” or “impracticable” to account for. But the
sketches provided by the examples suggest otherwise. Some of the examples of
de minimis fringe benefits are small but frequent, such as work coffee. Some of
the examples are infrequent but also large, such as an occasional cocktail party
(if the party is sufficiently fancy). The examples communicate that the nonexample text does not have to be read in a conjunctive fashion.
The non-example portion of the regulations could also be read to suggest
that small size and infrequency are the only two factors that determine whether
accounting for a perk will be “unreasonable or administratively
impracticable.”216 But the relevant similarities and differences in the examples’
facts are not limited to the size or frequency of the benefit. One feature that
distinguishes the good (de minimis) examples from the bad (not de minimis)
examples is whether a small group of employees receives the benefit. The
examples to the good suggest that the listed perks are available to employees in
general, or at least to some decently sized subgroup of employees. The perks of
making local phone calls, drinking work coffee, or attending “picnics for
employees and their guests” are, as a matter of general experience, available to
larger groups of employees. In the examples to the bad, a country club
membership or the ownership of season tickets is often allocated to an individual
employee or some small subset of employees.217 Thus, the examples suggest that
whether the perk is widely or narrowly available may help determine whether
the perk is “unreasonable or impracticable to account for.”218 It is easier to keep
track of a benefit delivered individually to identified employees.219

215.
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(a) (2017) (defining de minimis fringe as “any property or
service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency with which similar fringes are
provided . . . ) so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable”).
216.
Id.
217.
There are “good” individual transfer examples to the contrary, but they involve
small transfers that are not based on seniority or rank, such as a bouquet of flowers or fruit sent “on
account of illness.” See 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (stating that “flowers, fruit, books, or similar property
provided to employees under special circumstances (e.g., on account of illness, outstanding performance,
or family crisis)” are de minimis).
218.
26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(a).
219.
This principle is different than the more formal rule against nondiscrimination in
favor of highly compensated employees, which does not apply to de minimis fringe benefits. I.R.C. §
132(j)(1) (2017). Indeed, other de minimis fringe benefit examples make clear that de minimis fringes can
be given to a group of highly compensated employees. For instance, “occasional typing of personal letters
by a company secretary” is a de minimis fringe. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(e)(1). The point here is that if a fringe
benefit singles out a particular employee (or employees) for a benefit that could be offered to other
employees but is not, the fringe benefit is less likely to be de minimis. Coffee offered to only one
employee, rather than the workforce at large, would be such an example.
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We can test the principles drawn from the examples by considering
additional hypotheticals. For instance, what if two employees get married, and
their employer pays for their wedding?220 It strains credulity to argue that such a
perk would qualify as a de minimis fringe. This perk would be large and easy to
account for, and so should not qualify for de minimis treatment, even if it could
be described as an “occasional cocktail party.” The principles gleaned from
analogical reasoning of the regulatory examples also reach this sound result.
Even though a wedding party is probably infrequent, it is valuable and
specifically directed to two individual employees, not to a large group of
employees.221 Focusing on the fact that this valuable perk is directed to two
employees suggests that the wedding party should be treated as taxable
compensation income. The fact that the analogical reasoning principles reach
this reasonable conclusion helps to affirm the principles themselves.
To be clear, analogical reasoning does not necessarily yield one definite
meaning from regulatory examples. A reader could look at the examples we
discussed above and argue that they support a different principle than the ones
we suggest. That is the nature of analogical reasoning. One could perhaps argue,
for instance, that the examples given of de minimis fringes do not turn on
whether the fringe benefit is given to a small number of employees, but rather
on how easy the fringe benefit is to account for. This reading of the examples
would make ease of accountability a more important factor for the non-example
portion of the regulation, and the examples would be used in this reading to
provide real-life gloss regarding the ease of accountability. Our claim here is not
that one particular reading of examples is going to be clearly right following the
application of an analogical process, but rather that the analogical reasoning tools
of relevance, similarity, and governing principles support disciplined arguments
about the meaning of regulatory examples.222 Analogical reasoning sets
parameters within which reasonable arguments can be made about the meaning
of regulatory examples.223

220.
Cf. Emily Peck, Real-Life Dream Boss Wants to Pay for Your Wedding,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chieh-huang-boxedwedding_us_57472d50e4b055bb117178ab [http://perma.cc/L9ZE-BJJS] (reporting on a company that
pays wedding expenses and college tuition).
221.
The individual nature of the benefit is stronger if the employees make decisions
about the party, such as venue, menu, guest list, and so forth.
222.
Cf. Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1197 (“Of course a practice such as analogical
reasoning is quite different from a rule: just how judges are to draw comparisons among cases is not
something that can be captured in canonical form. Nevertheless, a practice of analogical reasoning,
ingrained by training and tradition, can work indirectly—in the manner of a rule—to improve the quality
of judicial decisionmaking.”).
223.
Even under Auer, an agency’s interpretation is bound by permissibility, see supra
note 48, and analogical reasoning provides a discipline for determining permissibility of a given
interpretation.
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D. Reconciling Regulatory Examples with the Regulatory and Statutory
Scheme
Regulatory examples do not sit in isolation. Understanding their meaning
also requires integrating results from the analogical process with the rest of the
regulatory and statutory scheme. Reconciling regulatory examples with the rest
of the regulatory and statutory scheme can be done through various background
approaches to regulatory interpretation, such as textualism or purposivism.224 In
other words, our approach is consistent with, and extends the reach of, existing
background interpretive theories.
In terms of the existing background interpretive theories, while most
approaches advise reading text in context, they differ in terms of what context
matters. Textualists tend to emphasize semantic context, and may focus on
textual clues, such as non-example regulatory text, to supply evidence of
examples’ meaning.225 Purposivists emphasize the policy context for a
regulation, and may look to statements of regulatory purpose, like the
regulations’ introductory preamble, for evidence of examples’ meaning. Other
interpretive approaches may blend these emphases.226
To illustrate how to reconcile analogical reasoning interpretations and the
broader regulatory and statutory context, we return to the Department of
Transportation’s example that states that SARS on airplanes “probably” poses a
direct threat.227 The example’s indecision invites the conclusion that the public
access and public health concerns of the regulation are closely in balance for a
passenger with SARS. Can an effort to reconcile the example with its regulatory
and statutory context clarify the meaning of this example?
The source statute for this regulation states, in part, that “an air carrier . . .
may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the . . . grounds
[that] the individual has a physical or mental impairment.”228 The instruction in
the statute is to avoid “discrimination” against an “individual,” and the statute’s
language for including people with disabilities follows that of other
antidiscrimination statutes, such as those in the public accommodation and
employment context.229 Perhaps the anti-discrimination roots of the statutory
224.
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 49, at 78-91; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) (both emphasizing that textualists, like purposivists,
agree that text must be understood in context).
225.
See Manning, supra note 49, at 91 (“Textualists give primacy to semantic context
. . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
372 (1994) (emphasizing “linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons”); Max Radin, A Short Way
with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 407-08 (1942) (rejecting the idea of legislative “will”).
226.
See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 132, at 345-62 (describing a practical
approach to interpretation in the statutory context).
227.
14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b) (2017).
228.
See supra note 6.
229.
See Bradley Allan Areheart & Michael Ashley Stein, Integrating the Internet, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 451 (2015) (explaining how the source statute exists as part of a group of federal
statutes designed to carry out the vision of the rights of disabled individuals to “live in the world”).
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provision point in favor of individualized assessments. However, it is also
possible to achieve anti-discrimination objectives through a general rule, to
minimize the chance that an airline employee, for example, will inappropriately
discriminate. In addition, by allowing for exclusion of passengers with
communicable diseases that pose a “direct threat,” the regulation carves out
exceptions to the anti-discrimination dictate of the statute. In sum, the statute
provides little guidance regarding how individualized or general this regulatory
exception should be.
The non-example portion of the regulation, as well as the broader
regulatory scheme, seems to contemplate an individualized approach to
determining whether passengers pose a direct threat. The non-example portion
of the regulation acknowledges the relevance of the seriousness and
communicability of a disease,230 but also mentions other factors that should be
taken into account. It cross-references another passenger disability regulation
that calls for an “individualized” cost-benefit analysis, including the factors of
risk, “potential harm . . . to others” and the availability of risk mitigation steps.231
It states that if a passenger has a medical certificate provided by the passenger’s
own doctor describing measures designed to prevent transmission of the disease,
the passenger may be able to fly, even if the passenger poses direct threat.232 If a
direct threat exists, a cross-referenced regulation requires the “select[ion]” of
“the least restrictive response.”233 All of these features suggest an individualized
approach, rather than a categorical rule that would, for instance, allow exclusion
of all SARS patients.
In contrast, the preamble supports general or categorical policies. It
suggests that the current rule was meant to depart from the overwhelming
emphasis placed on individual assessment in a prior version of the rule.
According to the preamble, the revisions to the current regulations responded to
requests for “greater guidance” regarding the rules.234 The earlier regulation
listed a number of factors to consider in the determination of whether a passenger

230.
231.
232.

14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b).
Id. § 382.19(c)(1)-(2).
The regulation reads:

(c) If a passenger with a communicable disease meeting the direct threat criteria of this
section gives you a medical certificate . . . describing measures for preventing transmission
of the disease during the normal course of the flight, you must provide transportation to the
passenger, unless you are unable to carry out the measures.
Id. § 382.21(c) (2017). The doctor’s note may include “measures” that should be followed “for preventing
the disease during the normal course of flight,” in which case the airline may refuse transportation if it is
“unable to carry out the measures.” Id.
233.
Id. Indeed, this cross-referenced regulation then cross-references a definition of
“direct threat” from another portion of the regulations, which is a “significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services.” Id. § 318.3.
234.
73 Fed. Reg. 27,614-01, 27,624 (May 13, 2008).
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presented a direct threat, without any clear demarcation of relative importance
or how they should be employed to make a determination.235 The preamble
explains that the current version was intended to provide greater certainty and
less discretion.236
The preamble reveals its categorical view with respect to SARS in
particular:
To be a direct threat, a condition must be both able to be readily transmitted by
casual contact in the course of a flight AND have severe health consequences (e.g.,
SARS, active tuberculosis). If a condition is readily transmissible but does not
typically have severe health consequences (e.g., the common cold), or has severe
health consequences but is not readily transmitted by casual conduct in the course
of a flight (e.g., HIV), its presence would not create a direct threat. Carriers may
also rely on directives issued by public health authorities (e.g., in the context of a
future flu pandemic).237

The preamble also states:
Under this provision, carriers would have the ability to impose travel restrictions
and/or require a medical certificate if a passenger presented with a communicable
disease that was both readily transmitted in the course of a flight and which had
238
serious health consequences (e.g., SARS, but not AIDS or a cold).

Together, these provisions reveal the preamble’s clear view that SARS
meets the severity and transmissibility requirements and poses a direct threat as
a categorical or general rule, so that airlines could implement general measures
targeted at passengers with SARS.
To recap: The regulatory examples indicate that a “direct threat”
determination for SARS requires a determination of severity and
transmissibility, and is a close call.239 The non-example portion of the regulations
support an individualized assessment, not a general determination that
passengers with SARS always pose a direct threat.240 In contrast, the preamble
235.

The prior version of the regulation stated:

In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a
carrier must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies
on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the
nature, duration, and severity of the risk; that the potential harm to the health and safety of
others will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
procedures will mitigate the risk.
14 C.F.R. § 382.51 (repealed May 13, 2008).
236.
See 73 Fed. Reg. at 27,615 (stating that in “the Department’s experience . . .
detailed standards and requirements are essential”).
237.
Id. at 27,648.
238.
Id. at 27,624.
239.
See supra text accompanying note 227.
240.
See supra text accompanying notes 230-233.
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supports a categorical approach that an airline can treat SARS as a direct threat
and therefore restrict passengers with SARS.241
Regardless of the preferred background theory of interpretation (in other
words, textualism, purposivism, or an alternative), it is hard to escape the
conclusion that, relative to the prior version of the regulation, the current version
of the diseases-on-airplanes regulation moves away from an individualized
approach toward a general rule approach.242 The non-example portion of the
direct threat regulation is much more specific about which factors must be
considered in making a direct threat determination compared to prior versions of
the regulation. It emphasizes severity and ease of transmissibility as the
important factors for a direct threat determination.243 But despite this clear trend
toward a general rule approach, the choice between an individualized assessment
and a categorical decision that SARS is a direct threat may differ based on the
chosen background interpretive approach.
A textualist may be less inclined to look to provisions in the preamble,
particularly when the preamble makes a general statement that conflicts with the
text of the actual regulation.244 Since the actual regulation situates the examples
within a regulatory framework that still calls for an individualized approach, a
strong textualist may favor an individualized interpretation. She may dismiss the
idea that the regulations should be interpreted to mean that SARS categorically
poses a direct threat.
A purposivist, in contrast, may adhere to the preamble’s clear conclusion
that SARS categorically poses a direct threat.245 Such an approach may read
Example 3’s “probably” conclusion to cover only situations in which there was
241.
See supra text accompanying notes 234-238.
242.
The middle-ground approach that we use in this analysis subscribes to a “practical”
school of interpretation. This kind of interpretation privileges enacted text, but also assesses the meaning
of a given provision based on evidence from a number of reliable sources, depending on their relative
importance and reliability in a given context. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 132, at 345-62.
243.
See supra text accompanying notes 199-200. The current version of the regulations
provides a more individualized approach in the general passenger disability context than in the
communicable disease context. Indeed, the cross-referenced passenger disability provision uses language
almost identical to the old version of the communicable disease regulation. Compare 14 C.F.R. § 382.19
(2017), with 14 C.F.R. § 382.51 (repealed May 13, 2008). In discussing the passenger disability provision
(which remains current), the preamble to the current version of the regulations explains that carriers must
make an “individualized assessment.” 73 Fed. Reg. 27,614-01 (May 13, 2008).
244.
See, e.g., Nou, supra note 51, at 120 (“By contrast to Stack’s purposivist approach,
regulatory textualism rejects reliance on the broad statements of purpose often found in preambles in favor
of the more specific explanatory provisions.”).
245.
Compare, e.g., Nou, supra note 51, at 118-20, with Stack, supra note 39, at 398401 (each relying heavily on preambles for interpretation, but analyzed under a textualist interpretation
and purposive interpretation, respectively). The use of preamble material is not without controversy. See,
e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 228 (2007) (arguing that agency preamble statements about preemption of
state law produce an effect of “backdoor federalization”) (citing and quoting Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006)); see also Kevin M.
Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 684-85 (2015)
(explaining that under a purposivist method of regulatory interpretation, the two privileged sources are
the text of the regulation and the explanation of the regulation in the preamble).
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possibly (but not definitely) transmissibility. Perhaps the SARS example means
to anticipate some future, more hygienic state of the world in which SARS is in
fact not transmissible in an airplane environment. This reading implies that, as
long as a patient has SARS and it is readily transmissible, SARS poses a direct
threat. Or, a purposivist might argue more forcefully that the preamble embraces,
as a factual matter, the conclusion that SARS is definitely readily transmissible.
It would follow that SARS, in all cases, poses a direct threat.
The point here is not to advocate for one or another background approach
to regulatory interpretation, such as purposivism or textualism. Rather, the goal
is to show that regulatory examples play an important role in illuminating a
regulation’s meaning regardless of the background interpretive approach.
Recognizing regulatory examples as a form of law and using analogical
reasoning to make meaning of them allows the guidance from regulatory
examples to be pieced together with other regulatory and statutory materials to
develop a fuller regulatory interpretation. The method we offer both dovetails
with, and extends the reach of, various existing background theories for
regulatory interpretation.
Conclusion
Scholars have proposed how background theories of interpretation, such as
purposivism, textualism, and intentionalism, should apply to regulations. But
theories of regulatory interpretation have not yet considered many unique
interpretive questions raised by common regulatory drafting practices. One such
common practice is the use of regulatory examples, or statements of legal
conclusions based on hypothetical facts within the text of final regulations.
Although examples are widely used, their legal status remains subject to doubt.
This Article argues that regulatory examples make law. Treating regulatory
examples as a co-equal form of law empowers agencies to use concrete
communication strategies and honors regulated parties’ tendency to respond to
examples as a form of law. We show how examples’ legal content is best
discovered through analogical, case-law-like reasoning. We also show how the
guidance from analogical reasoning must be reconciled with the broader
regulatory and statutory scheme, and how this can be done in a manner that is
consistent with existing, background interpretive approaches.
This Article brings regulatory examples into the interpretive conversation.
Examples pervade regulations and play an important, but unsettled, role in
regulatory law. Understanding how meaning should be made of them can
improve the common practice of regulating by example.
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